IN 1919 the American Medical Association asked the commissioner of Internal Revenue to call a conference to consider better control of traffic in narcotic drugs. Faced with an amalgam of conflicting state laws, the profession was uncertain of its obligations in the matter. The AMA asked that the wholesale, retail, and manufactur-ing drug interests be among those attending, along with delegates from the medical profession in each state. The proposal received no official or unofficial response either from the commissioner of Internal Revenue or the Bureau of Prohibition. Nevertheless, the AMA, through its own Council on Health and Public Instruction, held a conference in early 1922 during which a uniform state narcotic control law was presented. At another conference the following November there were present fifteen representatives of ten pharmaceutical organizations and two representatives of the medical profession. The draft of a uniform law was approved unanimously. The AMA set out to codify the draft and to send it for approval to each of the constituent organizations.1 After secur-ing approval, all the associations agreed to pursue enactment first in New York.
One impetus for the American Medical Association's concern was the lack of uniformity among state narcotic laws. A second and equally important concern was the laxity of state enforcement of the narcotic laws.2 The medical director of the Boston Munici-pal Court, for example, called for more effective enforcement of Massachusetts' 1917 antinarcotic law:
Our laws aiming at the suppression of morphinism could perhaps be better, but no matter whether they be improved or not, they will not have their maximal efficiency without ade-quate appropriations for their enforcement. Even with the insufficient funds now  available, more could be reached. I understand, for instance, that there is no special police force (white squads) entrusted with the detection and arrest of cases of VDL [Violation of the Drug Law] and that officers are very much hampered by not being allowed to follow suspected persons outside their particular districts.3
The lack of uniformity4 and the weakness of state enforcement procedures,5 together with the growing hysteria about dope fiends and criminality,6 also converged in prompting several requests outside the medical community for a uniform state narcotic law.7
These proposals for drafting a uniform narcotic drug act occurred against the background of two larger movements: the trend toward the creation and dissemination of uniform state laws by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, a group to which each state sent two representatives appointed by its governor; and the general concern in the late twenties and early thirties with interstate criminal networks, manifested, for example, by the creation in 1930 of the nearly autonomous Federal Bureau of Investigation. Because the concepts of states' rights and narrowly construed federal power were still powerful, an appeal to the national commissioner was the inevitable recourse for those press-ing for uniform antinarcotic regulation.
Marihuana Sneaks In and Out
In 1924 the commissioners appointed a committee to draft a uniform narcotic drug act that it could recommend for state adoption. At the 1925 meeting of commissioners, the chairman of the committee reported that he himself had prepared a first tenta-tive draft based on the 1921 New York act, the Washington state legislation, the Harrison Act, and a bill then before the New York legislature. Presumably this bill was the one drafted by the AMA conference after its 1922 meeting. The tentative draft included cannabis in the list of "habit-forming drugs" that could be distri-buted and used only for medical purposes.8 The chairman noted, however, that Dr. William Woodward, head of the AMA's Bureau of Legal Medicine and Legislation, with whom he had only recently conferred, had made "some very valuable suggestions." Because the tentative draft had already been printed before he received these suggestions, he requested that it "not be read but be re-committed to the Committee."9 A second tentative draft was presented in 1928 and again the draft was not discussed at the conference but was recommitted for further study. The second draft was essentially a copy of the 1927 New York statute. It also included cannabis in the class of habit-forming drugs.10
The lack of concern on the part of the commissioners themselves with the whole narcotics problem between 1924 and 1928 is re-flected in the remarks of the president of the conference. Introducing Dr. Woodward, President Miller said: "In view of the importance of the act I think it would not be amiss to listen to the Doctor for a few minutes, that he may point out to us why it is important. In some of the states we do not recognize the impor-tance because it has not been called to our attention."11 Nor was the Bureau of Prohibition particularly concerned at this time with the cannabis provision. Deputy Commissioner Nutt, who was in charge of the narcotics division until 1930, commented on the first tentative draft: "With respect to the definition of cannabis indica or cannabis sativa, this office does not feel qualified to make any recommendations as these substances are not included in the Federal Narcotic Laws."12 Lack of official concern and interest continued to affect the bureau's attitude toward the second tentative draft.13
Since neither the commissioners nor the federal narcotics officials were particularly concerned about state and local control of narcotics generally and marihuana in particular, it seems clear that neither was responsible for the inclusion of marihuana in the category of "habit-forming drugs." Rather, it would appear that this substance was included in the first draft because it was "another narcotic" listed in various state laws, particularly in the 1923 Washington statute from which the first draft was drawn. As the second draft was a copy of the 1927 New York act, its presence there is no mystery. It is unlikely that any of the persons involved in the drafting were concerned about marihuana-smoking. At best they might have been aware of its use in a few isolated regions.
Two third drafts were submitted, the first in 1929 and the second in 1930. The initial one closely resembled the second ten-tative draft, and once again it included cannabis in the category of "habit-forming drugs." Again, the growth, distribution, and posses-sion of cannabis were prohibited except for medical purposes.
Unlike the previous drafts, this one received the full attention of the Bureau of Prohibition's narcotics division. now headed by Harry Anslinger. The bureau's comments on the third tentative draft reflect its emerging policy of supporting action on the state, rather than the federal, level:
Sub-paragraph 12 covering cannabis sativa and its derivatives does not at present come within the purview of the two princi-pal Federal narcotic laws. However, many complaints have reached this office of the abuse of this form of drug in certain localities. In view of what is understood to be its very limited medical use and its lack of dependability as to potency, query is made whether this drug could not be absolutely proscribed and its limited function as a medicine met by some substitute. From the limited information in possession of this office it is believed that the elimination of the abuse of this drug is a consideration which greatly outweighs that of its possibly very limited medical use, particularly if the latter need could be met by some less potentially harmful substitute.14
Like its predecessors, the initial third tentative draft was rec9m-mitted for further study.15
The other third tentative draft, submitted in 1930, removed cannabis from the category of "habit-forming drugs" and included only a supplemental provision for dealing with the drug.16 A note following the supplemental section states the reason for this change:
Note: Because of the many objections raised to the inclusion of cannabis indica, cannabis americana and cannabis sativa in the general list of habit-forming drugs, no mention is made of them in other sections of this act. The foregoing section is presented in order to meet the apparent demand for some method of prevent-ing the use of such drugs for the production and maintenance of undesirable drug addiction. It may be adopted or rejected, as each state sees fit, without affecting the rest of the act.17
The conference's official record provides no clue as to the sources of the "many objections" to classifying marihuana with the "habit-forming drugs." We should recall, however, Dr. Woodward's sarcas-tic memorandum to Anslinger and the Federal Narcotics Control Board concerning S.2075 under which cannabis would have been included in the Import and Export Act. In that memorandum, he noted that he had been surveying the pharmaceutical industry and that on the basis of the response, he had reversed his own previous opinion that cannabis was habit-forming." As a result, it seems that Dr. Woodward relegated cannabis to an optional status in the subsequent third tentative draft.
When the conference of commissioners met to consider the second version of the third tentative draft, Judge Deering, chair-man of the Committee on the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, recommended its recommission for further study because the committee had not yet had an opportunity to consult the newly created Bureau of Narcotics. At the time of this conference, 14 August 1930, no one had yet been appointed commissioner of the bureau, although Anslinger was acting commissioner.19
After Anslinger became commissioner he moved the bureau into the thick of the drafting process for the fourth and fifth tentative drafts. Involved before only on an advisory basis, the bureau now sought to become an equal partner with the AMA. Anslinger him-self felt that had the bureau remained on the sidelines, "a delay of another year would have been the case."2° In large part, the bureau's involvement provided an antidote to the internecine squabbles developing between the drug industry and the medical profession. Early in 1932, in fact, only a major effort by the Federal Narcotics Bureau and the surgeon general prevented a wholesale battle that clearly would have postponed conference adoption of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act.
The bureau's involvement converted the cannabis provision from an appendage of little importance to a major bone of contention. Anslinger, having chosen the Uniform Act as the bureau's first priority on the marihuana issue, seems to have decided soon after his ascendency to seek the total prohibition of domestic marihuana cultivation, sale, possession, and even use for medical purposes. The commissioner was convinced that the limited medical use for cannabis was far outweighed by the need to control potential cannabis addiction.21 The battle lines had formed: Woodward and the pharmaceutical industry advocated optional inclusion of mari-huana; the federal narcotics bureaucracy urged not only inclusion but elimination of medical use.
The fourth tentative draft retained the optional cannabis provi-sion, despite Commissioner Anslinger's objections. In all its comments on the fourth tentative draft and the cannabis section, the FBN was most careful to protest its lack of any official connec-tion with the issue altogether. Nevertheless, it is clear that inclusion of a strict marihuana provision in a uniform state law was a major part of the bureau's plan. This conclusion is buttressed by a letter from Anslinger to Dr. Woodward urging that the law contain such a provision dealing with cannabis.22 Unable to convinceWoodward, Anslinger took his case to the chairman of the committee. At an evening session before the convening of the full conference of commissioners from 9-12 September at Atlantic City, Commissioner Anslinger and A. L. Tennyson of the bureau met with Judge Deering to discuss the bureau's feelings about the fourth tentative draft, section by section. At this time Commissioner Anslinger stated again the bureau's position regarding marihuana—the bureau felt strongly that inclusion of cannabis in the state law ought to be mandatory. Moreover, the bureau once again urged that the only successful way to deal with the marihuana drug traffic, because of its domestic nature and the easy availability of the weed, was to prohibit the cultivation of the plant altogether and to find some substitute for its limited medical use.23
Apparently Anslinger was unable to convince Deering. The fourth tentative draft presented to the conference of commissioners again included only the optional marihuana provision. Anslinger discussed the matter with all of the commissioners. Again he proposed a total prohibition and again he was rebuffed. The conference tentatively approved the fourth draft and directed the committee to prepare a final draft.24 Commissioner Anslinger then went to the press, wielding the Warnshuis study for the Wickersham Commission linking marihuana, Mexicans, and crime. He hoped public pressure would force the commissioners to take his advice.25
Between the Atlantic City conference of commissioners in 1931 and their final conference in October 1932, the bureau found itself not only busily involved in the drafting of the proposed law but also caught in a cross fire of personalities and interests which almost sabotaged the drafting of any Uniform Narcotic Drug Act. In order to understand the bureau's role in this matter, one must first consider the ill-sorted collection of interest groups which had been involved in the drafting of the uniform law over its long history.
The American Medical Association played the dominant role in the drafting process until the entry of the FBN in 1931. Their efforts had been largely responsible for consideration of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act in the first place. Since 1925 Dr. Woodward, the director of their Bureau of Legal Medicine and Legislation, had single-handedly nurtured the drafting of the act and circulated the drafts to scores of interested persons for their comments. His reversal on the cannabis provision, for example, was precipitated by a survey of pharmaceutical houses. It appears, however, that Dr. Woodward's personal style and the preeminent position of the AMA in the drafting process were resented by the tWo remaining interest groups—the FBN and the retail and whole-sale pharmaceutical associations.
When Commissioner Anslinger, whose relations with Dr. Wood-ward were clearly uneasy, attempted to assume an active role for the bureau in the drafting process, he found it very difficult to avoid stepping on Woodward's toes. Frustrated by the bureau's formerly inactive role, Anslinger was not quite sure how to handle the situation and tried at first to enter the process informally arid gradually. Finally by August 1932 he was so anxious for the bureau to participate in the drafting of the fifth and final draft of the Uniform Act that he wrote to Judge Deering requesting a delay in the committee's consideration (this would grant the bureau an opportunity not only to review the draft prepared by Dr. Woodward but also to redraft and rewrite significant provisions):
I appreciate fully the necessity for the utmost expedition of this work and am quite anxious that there shall be no untoward delay on the part of this Bureau.... I appointed a Committee of Treasury Department lawyers to review Dr. Woodward's draft and, if considered necessary, to redraft such portions thereof to strengthen the measure from an enforcement standpoint.. . .
I had understood after the last Conference in Atlantic City that Dr. Woodward intended to redraft the measure in line with suggestions then made as early as possible after his arrival back in Chicago. But I believe that due to press of other official duties Dr. Woodward was unable to commence the work until sometime in May of this year. I received the last portion of Dr. Woodward's draft with a letter from him dated July 16, 1932 and the time we have had to review same, in view of the importance of the work, has been comparatively short, as I believe you will agree.26
Even within the AMA there was some grumbling about Dr. Woodward's role and his unwillingness to consult other interest groups, particularly the pharmaceutical industry.
The controversy erupted just before the fifth draft was presented.
Dr. William Charles White, an influential member of the association, wrote to the president of the AMA, Dr. Olin West, inquiring about the status of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act and suggesting that a conference be held to include all the leaders of the pharmaceutical profession with some "high official" of the American Medical Association—not Dr. Woodward. "The reason for suggesting some-one other than Dr. Woodward is to relieve the situation of a condition which has arisen largely because of his hard labor -and intimate association with this problem from the beginning."27 Dr. West responded:
Frankly I am somewhat surprised at some of the statements offered in your letter with respect to the attitude of Dr. Wooli-ward concerning some phases of the proposed legislation for control of narcotics. . . .
I happen to know that Dr. Woodward has done a great deal of arduous work in an effort to be helpful in drafting 'A Uniform State Law' and I feel very sure that it has not been his intention to antagonize other organizations that are actively interested in this matter. In a spirit of fairness to Dr. Woodward, I shall as soon as possible discuss with him the matters referred to in your letter and I shall be glad to write you again.28
Dr. Woodward responded directly to Dr. White in shock and dis-may. With respect to the charge that he had been insensitive to the concerns of the pharmaceutical industry and the drug trade, Dr. Woodward protested vehemently:
In the first place, I resent your charge of ignorance and intolerance with respect to the cooperation of manufacturing chemists, pharmacists, pharmaceutical houses, and other groups.
You suggest the importance of consulting such groups as if it were a bright and new idea of your own. As a matter of fact, they have been frequently consulted not only by me, but by the Council on Health and Public Instruction before I assumed my present duties with the American Medical Association.29
The pharmaceutical industry itself felt that their interests were considered only peripherally and that they had been excluded from the heart of the drafting process. As one spokesman for the industry put it, Woodward was trying "to limit the consideration of the fifth tentative draft of the AMA Bill to his Association and Judge Deering and his subcommittee."3° On the other hand, Dr. Woodward and Dr. West detailed numerous instances in which representatives of the drug industry were invited not only to sub-mit comments but also to participate in conferences and drafting sessions. They both strongly argued that the pharmaceutical associ-ations had every opportunity to engage in the drafting of legislation and had failed of their own volition to take advantage of these opportunities. They went on to suggest that in raising this ques-tion at this time, the associations were actually trying to block the passage of the final draft, which was scheduled for presentation two months hence.31 As Dr. Woodward wrote: "In any event, the criticism of my course is so widespread and has reached such imp6rtant places that I have no doubt whatever that it has been deliberately promoted to serve the ulterior purposes of some interest that is unwilling to be known in connection with the matter."32
Finally, Assistant Surgeon General Treadway, seeing the "need to remedy a situation which was getting somewhat out of hand," intervened. Treadway succinctly isolated the perspective of the federal narcotic bureaucracy when he noted:
The attitude of these so-called "vested interests" concerned with the sale, distribution and uses of narcotic drugs have tended to regard Dr. Woodward's attitude in the matter as not talking frankly across the table. One's instinctive reaction toward matters of this sort, especially in the professional field, is to ignore the demands of the "vested interests" and "commercial organizations" who may be interested in the materialistic side of the subject. Yet I know that certain organizations, unless they are in accord, can balk and defeat any legislation submitted to a state legislature when they have not had the opportunity to air their views or to come to some previous uniform understanding and agreement.3 3 [emphasis added]
Treadway was well aware of the political influence of the pharmaceutical industry, the National Association of Retail Drug-gists, the Federal Wholesale Drug Association, and the Pharmaceu-tical Manufacturers' Association, among others, and he tried to smooth things over. A conference of interested parties with the committee was therefore scheduled before the final draft was to be presented to the conference of commissioners.
Despite the controversy that was raging, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics maintained strict neutrality in the Woodward matter. For this reason the bureau was largely responsible for pushing the fifth and final draft to its timely conclusion. While the other interests involved were distracted during the months of July and August 1932, the FBN diligently continued to prepare its comments and a redraft for the preliminary conference.
The Bureau Retreats on Marihuana
Present at this conference on 15 September 1932 were representa-tives of the Deering committee, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the Department of State, the Public Health Service, the Amerian Medical Association, and delegates from the drug industry and other health-related industries and organizations. The final version of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act was hammered out at this session. The bureau was central to the drafting process, and Commissioner Anslinger made a major effort to involve the drug manufacturers and the wholesale and retail drug trade in it to protect the act from possible subsequent political sabotage.34 Finally, the conference agreed on a draft to be presented to the national conference in October.
One manifestation of this strategy of accommodation to the pharmaceutical interests was the bureau's modulation of its policy on the marihuana issue. As early as 1929 the American Pharmaceu-tical Association had objected to the "effort being made by sensationalistic papers to enlarge upon the extended use of mari-huana." At that time, the surgeon general had begun to prepare the industry for eventual state legislation.35 Yet, as Woodward's survey late the same year showed, a consensus of opinion had emerged in the industry that regulation of the distribution of cannabis was wholly unnecessary because the drug was not habit-forming, because medical preparations were not responsible for whatever abuse there was, and because effective control, in any event, depended upon elimination of domestic growth. The industry generally regarded prohibitory legislation as counterproductive. One respondent wrote: "It would seem to me that in regard to regulations, it would be better left exactly as it is today rather than penalize its use thus bringing publicity to it where there is apparently a considerable lack of evidence of its harmfulness." A more cryptic response was, "Absolute Rot. It is not necessary. I have never known of its misuse."36 The manufacturers of drug products were strongly opposed to the inclusion of cannabis under any criminal regulatory scheme. When the fifth tentative draft was circulated to representatives of the drug industry, one important spokesman said bluntly: "Strike the cannabis section. Section 12. This Section should not be incorporated in this draft at all as the abuse complained of is altogether local and limited to extremely narrow territory."37
At. the preliminary conference the pharmaceutical industry was not the lone dissenter on the cannabis provision. Spokesmen for the domestic hemp industry also stated its opposition:
After a lengthy discussion regarding cannabis, Judge Deering stated that the definition as suggested by Dr. Woodward should be made more clear and then it should be left to the Conference to decide whether or not cannabis should be included in the Act. At this point, Dr. Woodward called attention to the report of the United States Public Health Service, dated July 10, 1932, in which the statement was made that 28,000 acres of Indian Hemp were under cultivation in the United States last year.
Mr. Thompson (the Proprietary Association) objected to the inclusion of cannabis in the Act because of the effect it would have on the hemp industry of Kentucky.38
The final conclusion reached by all the parties present was: "After considerable comment, it was decided to eliminate Section 12 (Cannabis) and leave it to the Conference of Commissioners as to whether it should be included under the general provisions of the Act."39
The bureau had now retreated, it appears, on the marihuana issue and was no longer insisting on the mandatory inclusion of an absolute prohibition. Risking the opposition of the drug industry to the entire act simply was not worth it. Moreover, it was probably felt that the hemp industry could secure deletion of the cannabis provision in some states even if it were included in the draft. Despite the fact that the final decision was to be left to the plenary conference of commissioners, the bureau seems to have given up.
The fifth tentative draft did, however, include a significant change in form which would have important consequences in the decades to come. Although the marihuana provision remained supplemental to the main body of the act, any state wishing to regulate the sale and possession of marihuana was instructed simply to add cannabis to the definition of "narcotic drugs." All the other provisions of the act would then apply to marihuana as well as to the opiates and cocaine. It appears that the Narcotics Bureau felt that this method of amending the act would facilitate the addition of other drugs in the future.4° As a result of this technical modi-fication, marihuana came to be defined as a "narcotic" in every state. Of equal importance was the fact that this format assured that legislators would not distinguish between marihuana and the opiates in any subsequent effort to increase penalties for "narcotits” offenses.
The proceedings of the plenary conference of commissioners, held on 8 October 1932, do not contain any synopsis of debate on the subject of whether or not cannabis should be induded in the act. Predictably, the cannabis provision remained optional, and the commissioners adopted the fifth tentative draft as it had been prepared at the 15 September conference without major change. Indeed, although the anticipatory conflict between and among the medical and drug interests was quite controversial, the proceedings of the National Conference of Commissioners on the Uniform Drug Act are practically devoid of substance.
The only recorded opposition to the adoption of the final draft came from some commissioners who objected to tying the Uniform State Law to the terms of the federal Harrison Act. This last obstacle was overcome by the argument that a number of states already had passed such legislation, so that the states' rights problem need not stand in the way. This brief debate confirms the notion that the act received very little attention, if any , from the commissioners other than those sitting on the committee which drafted it.41 The act was adopted 26 to 3.42 No one challenged or even brought up the issue of the designations of the drugs to be prohibited.
1. Dr. William White to Assistant Surgeon General Treadway, 3 Aug. 1932; Dr. William Woodward to Dr. S. L. Hilton, 6 Aug. 1932.
2. See New York, Senate, Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate the Laws in Relation to the Distribution and Sale of Narcotic Drugs, Final Report (Albany, 1918), Doc. no. 35: "No fixed policy exists for the enforcement of the State statutes except in the larger cities of the State but their enforcement has been left to the desultory or spasmodic efforts of local police officials . . .," quoted by Terry and Pellens, The Opium Problem (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1928), p. 834. See also H. S. Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963),pp. 137-38.
3. Sandoz, "Report on Morphinism to the Municipal Court of Boston,"Journal of Crimina/ Law and Criminology, 13 (1922), 54 (emphasis original).
4. State Laws (1931), pp. 31-34.
5. Ibid., p. 28.
6. See Special Committee to Investigate the Traffic in Narcotic Drugs, U.S. Treasury Department Report, 1919.
7. H. J. Anslinger and W. Tompkins, The Traffic in Narcotics (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1953), p. 159.
8. 1925 Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings (Baltimore: Lord Baltimore Press, 1925), pp. 977-85 (here-after cited as 19 -- Handbook).
9. Ibid., p. 978.
10. 1928 Handbook, pp. 75-78, 323-33.
11. Ibid., pp. 76-77.
12. Nutt to Walter Clephane, chairman, Section on Social Welfare, Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 12 July 1928.
13. Nutt to Clephane, 13 June 1929.
14. Nutt to Woodward, 4 Oct. 1929.
15. 1929 Handbook, pp. 43, 332-40.
16. 1930 Handbook, pp. 485-97.
17. Ibid., p. 493.
18. Woodward to Anslinger, 28 Apr. 1930.
19. 1930 Handbook, pp. 126-27.
20. Anslinger to Woodward, Oct. 1932.
21. Anslinger to Woodward, 28 July 1930.
22. Anslinger to Woodward, 7 May 1931.
23. A. L. Tennyson, "Consideration of a Uniform State Narcotic Law by the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws at Atlantic City, New Jersey, Sept. 9-12, 1931," memorandum for file dated 16 Sept. 1931.
24. 1931 Handbook, pp. 127-28, 390-402.
25. Christian Science Monitor, 3 Oct. 1931.
26. Anslinger to Judge Deering, 1 Aug. 1932.
27. White to West, 1 July 1932.
28. West to White, 8 July 1932.
29. Woodward to White, 12 July 1932.
30. E. Brookmeyer, general counsel for the National Association of Retail Drug-gists, to Anslinger, 28 July 1932.
31. West to Treadway, 3 Aug. 1932; Woodward to Dr. S. L. Hilton, 6 Aug. 1932.
32. Woodward to Hilton, 6 Aug. 1932; Woodward to Anslinger, 30 July'1932.
33. Treadway to West, 25 July 1932.
34. Anslinger to Deering, 1 Aug. 1932.
35. Officer of the Journal of American Pharmaceutical Association to surgeon general, June 1929; Hugh Cummings to the Journal of American Pharmaceutical Associ-ation, 10 June 1929.
36. Woodward to Anslinger, 28 Apr. 1930.
37. Brookmeyer to Anslinger and Deering, June 1932.
38. Report of the Preliminary Conference Held in Federal Reserve Board Conference Room, Treasury Department, to discuss the Fifth Tentative Draft of the Uniform State Narcotic Law (Washington, D.C., 15 Sept. 1932), pp. 9-10.
39. Ibid., p. 23.
40. 1932 Handbook, pp. 95-107, 326; see Tennyson, "Uniform State Narcotic Law," Federal Bar Association Journal, 1 (1935), 55; "Illicit Drug Traffic," Federal Bar Association Journal, 2 (1935), 208-9, indicating that the simple amendments for marihuana were desired by the bureau so that other drugs could be added in the same way.
41. 1932 Handbook, p. 107.
42. From our own computations, the total time spent by all the commissioners discussing this act from 1927 to 1932 could not have exceeded one hour. Moreover, the small number of states present at the time of the roll call, as compared with the forty-eight that voted on the Uniform Machine Gun Act the day before, indicated that concern for this act was less than overwhelming.