THE FIRST CRY to Washington for help in suppressing marihuana came from El Paso. In 1914 the deputy sheriff decided that Mexicans should no longer be permitted to bring any more "loco weed" across the Rio Grande. He had little difficulty persuading local representatives of the federal government to recommend the only available administrative action: a declaration by the secretary of agriculture that importations of cannabis "were being used for purposes other than in the preparation of medicines and that, unless used in medicinal preparations, this drug is believed to be injurious to health."' Upon such a declaration, the secretary of the treasury was authorized under the Food and Drug Act of 1906 to deny importation of the drug if it was not intended for medical purposes. On 25 September 1915, after the El Paso recommenda-tion had 'traveled routinely through all the administrative channels, the treasury secretary in Treasury Decision (T.D.) 35719 so de-clared; hence all Mexicans who crossed the border with the weed on their person were now guilty of smuggling. In addition, the commissioner of Internal Revenue, in his 1915 report, recom-mended the inclusion of cannabis in the Harrison Act, reiterating the suggestions of Drs. Lambert and Wright four years earlier. This proposal went virtually unnoticed.
As the history of T.D. 35719 suggests, several branches of the federal bureaucracy were involved in drug regulation. Enforcement of the Harrison Narcotic Act was the responsibility of the com-missioner of Internal Revenue until 1927. Then these duties were transferred to a separate Bureau of Prohibition in the Treasury Department.2 It will be recalled that the Harrison Act was drafted as a tax law rather than an outright regulatory or prohibitory statute in order to accomplish indirectly what Congress believed, probably correctly, it could not do directly—that is, to regulate the possession and sale of narcotics. That the Supreme Court up-held the act as an exercise of taxing power by a slim five-to-four margin in 1919 had a significant bearing on the federal response to marihuana during the ensuing twenty years. In 1930 the nar-cotics area of the Prohibition Bureau's responsibilities was extracted and transferred to a separate Bureau of Narcotics.3
Medical scrutiny and research matters were the responsibility of the surgeon general—also located in the Treasury Department—and his administrative arm, the Public Health Service. Within the Public Health Service, drug matters came within the purview of the Hygienic L,aboratory, which later became the National Insti-tutes of Health. In 1929 Congress carved a separate "Narcotics Division" out of the Hygienic Laboratory,4 and renamed it the "Division of Mental Hygiene" the following year, designating its chief medical officer as an assistant surgeon genera1.5 Under the Pure Food and Drug Act domestic regulatory matters were the responsibility of the Bureau of Chemistry in the Department of Agriculture, while direct enforcement of the act's importation restrictions (as well as those under T.D. 35719) was the responsi-bility of the Bureau of Customs in the Treasury Department.
Dr. Alsberg, chief of the Bureau of Chemistry, dispatched his personal assistant, Reginald Smith, to the Southwest in 1917 to see how T.D. 35719 was working out. Smith's report,ô based on extensive interviews in eleven Texas cities, is of considerable interest. He found that marihuana was used infrequently for medical purposes—for childbirth, asthma, and gonorrhea—and then only by Mexicans "of low birth." The weed, however, was widely used for smoking by Mexicans and sometimes by "Negroes and lower class whites." Their demands were easily met by local cultivation, street sales, and by grocery stores and drug stores, some of which even advertised their product.
The imported supply, he found, came from two sources: smuggling from Mexico by local entrepreneurs in contravention of T.D. 35719, and distribution by major pharmaceutical houses that imported large quantities and distributed them in bulk form to druggists for over-the-counter sale.
The ardor with which Smith pursued his investigation (judging from the detail in his report, he probably interviewed every drug-gist in every city he visited) was matched only by the indignation with which he viewed the conduct of the pharmaceutical houses. He asserted that these firms, particularly Parke-Davis, were importing large amounts of the drug and distributing it to retail druggists in bulk or package form, even though they probably knew that physicians did not prescribe it in this form—only in extract or fluid —and that druggists did not use it in the preparation of medicinal compounds. Accordingly, he recommended that an investigation be made to ascertain how much of the drug was being sold by the leading drug manufacturers.
Finding that T.D. 35719 had been totally ineffective in curbing the use and distribution of marihuana and that, when smoked, the drug "is not only injurious to the health of the smoker but often causes him to commit heinous crimes," Smith urged inclusion of marihuana in the Harrison Act. He also recommended that federal authorities advise state officials to prohibit the sale or possession of the drug in bulk or package form.
Despite Smith's urgent pleas, federal authorities were not anxious either to antagonize the pharmaceutical industry or to draw further attention to the questionable constitutionality of the Harrison Act. The border states and New Orleans were left on thei own to deal with the killer weed. Washington showed no interest in going beyond the ineffectual declaration of T.D. 35719.
Evidently, Washington had its hands full with the enforcement of the Harrison and Volstead acts. In addition to changing the liquor habits of half of the adult population, the government was attempt-ing to,reduce a major addiction problem at home and to lead the cause of international drug control abroad. Whether or not the Harrison Act actually affected narcotics addiction, the "clean-up" psychology prevalent during this period mandated a continuing effort to root out drug use. Study after study was conducted on every level of government. Still there was no evidence of public familiarity with, or official interest in, marihuana outside the border and Gulf regions.
Two major drug studies, one conducted in 1918-197 by a special committee appointed by the secretary of the treasury and the other in 19248 by the U.S. Public Health Service, did not even mention marihuana. An interesting feature of the first study is the prominence it gave to local liquor prohibition as a cause of drug addiction. The committee speculated that increased sales of narcotics and patent medicines containing opiates in the southern states, where liquor prohibition had long been in effect, supported the thesis that nationwide prohibition would result in an increase in drug addiction. On the international front,9 the United States had assumed leadership in the control of drug traffic before the Hague Convention of 1912. In an effort to tighten its own restric-tions, the government enacted the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act in 1922.1° During the initial fifteen-year life of the Harrison Act, it is not surprising that isolated complaints about marihuana did not receive notice in Washington.
The Stir on Capitol Hill
In late 1928 several congressmen and senators had become interested in marihuana. By this time local authorities and newspapers, particularly in Texas, Colorado, and Louisiana, were drawing atten-tion to the scope of marihuana use. Congressman James O'Connor of New Orleans, having been advised by a constituent on 18 Dec-ember 1928 that marihuana "is being sold to school children to their great mental and physical injury," inquired of the Bureau of Prohibition whether the sale of marihuana could be prohibited by means other than amendment of the Harrison Act. If not,'he continued, "will you prepare the amendment, as I don't want [to] do something that might lead to confusion."11 Senator Sheppard of Texas was not so hesitant. On his own on 30 October 1929, he offered a bill (S. 2075) to amend the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act to include cannabis.
There was also a second reason for the increasing congressional awareness of marihuana. On 19 January 1929 Congress passed a bill authorizing the establishment of two "narcotic farms" for the treatment of persons addicted to the use of habit-forming drugs. In addition to the usual combination of opium and cocoa leaves and their derivatives, the legal definition of "habit-forming drugs" included also "Indian hemp" and "Peyote." For the first time in federal legislation, marihuana was classified with the narcotics.12
In the legislative history of the act, Indian hemp is hardly mentioned at al1,13 and its inclusion clearly was not attributable to any documented cases of cannabis "addiction" in the United States. The likely explanation for the language of the 1929 act lies in the greater awareness within official circles of cannabis' status as "another narcotic." This awareness may have stemmed in part from indictments of marihuana in the international forum.
The 1929 act, drafted in the Justice Department, was introduced in the House by Congressman Stephen G. Porter of Pennsylvania, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. He had been chairman of the United States delegation to the Second Geneva Opium Conference in 1924-25, which had for the first time placed cannabis under international control.
The first mention of marihuana on the international front had come during the preliminary negotiations for the Hague Conference of 1912. In its preparations for this conference, which represented an attempt to deal with the international opium traffic, Italy pro-posed that the production and traffic in Indian hemp drugs be included as part of the agenda." During the conference itself there was no mention of the drug, and the convention did not include cannabis in its provisions. In addition to the convention, however, the delegates signed a closing protocol supporting a statistical and scientific study of "the question of Indian hemp.. . with the object of regulating its abuses, should the necessity thereof be felt, by internal legislation or by an international agreement."15 This proposal was not mentioned again until 1923 when the fol-lowing resolution was passed by the Advisory Committee onTraffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs of the League of Nations:
IV. With reference to the proposal of the Government of the Union of South Africa that Indian hemp should be treated as one of the habit-forming drugs, the Advisory Committee recom-mends to the Council that, in the first instance, the Govern-ments should be invited to furnish to the League information as to the production and use of, and traffic in, this substance in their territories, together with their observations on the proposal of the Government of the Union of South Africa.16
At the Second Geneva Opium Conference in 1925 the Egyptians led the way by urging that hashish be included within the conven-tion. An Egyptian delegate presented a paper on the effects and use of hashish in Egypt, emphasizing the drug's precipitation of insanity: "The illicit use of hashish is the principal cause of most of the cases of insanity occurring in Egypt. In support of this contention, it may be observed that there are three times as many cases of mental alienation among men as among women, and it is an established fact that men are much more addicted to hashish than women."17
The Egyptian proposal was referred for study to a subcommittee which later in the year concluded that the "raw resin is at present of no therapeutic or industrial value"; that it was collected and traded only because it induced intoxication, its "noxious prepara-tions" ultimately causing addiction; and that any galenical pre-paration was derived from the plant itself rather than the resin. Accordingly, the subcommittee recommended:
The use of Indian Hemp and the preparation derived therefrom may only be authorized for medical or scientific purposes. The raw resin (charas), however, which is extracted from the female tops of the (plant) . . . not being at present utilized for medical purposes and only being liable to be utilized for harmful pur-poses in the same manner as other narcotics may no,t be produced, sold, traded in, etc. under any circumstances whatsoever.18
Primarily because the Indian delegation considered enforcement of such an agreement highly unfeasible for "reasons of an adminis-trative and social character," the plenary conference did not rat.ify the subcommittee's recommendation. Instead, the convention, as adopted by the conference, made internal control applicable only to the galenical preparations (extract and tincture). The rest of its references to the drug were purely hortatory. In Chapter IV of this convention, use of and trade in the resin were not prohibited as the subcommittee had recommended; however, importation and exportation of the resin was subjected to a system of special certificates. Finally, in Article 2, the parties to the convention undertook to "exercise an effective control of such a nature as to prevent the illicit internal traffic in Indian Hemp and especially in the resin."19
In terms of international drug control, the substantive impact of the Indian hemp provisions of the convention was modest. Indeed, the convention as a whole was a failure. Led by Congress-man Porter, the United States withdrew in February 1925 before the conference concluded, and very few countries ratified the convention. By obligating the signatories to limit the use of marihuana to medical and scientific purposes, however, it stamped an international imprimatur on the classification of marihuana as a habit-forming drug, the intoxicant use of which should not be condoned. This is reflected in the fact that Great Britain's mari-huana control laws are traceable to the Geneva Convention. Similarly, the reference to Indian hemp in the "narcotic farm" act probably stemmed from the drug's inclusion in state narcotics legislation and in the convention rather than from any perception that its use posed any significant domestic concern.
Not surprisingly, the inclusion of marihuana in the 1929 act triggered a number of requests for information from the surgeon general and the Bureau of Prohibition. For example, Senator Vandenberg wondered why, if marihuana was a "narcotic," it was not included in the Harrison and Import and Export acts.20
The Bureaucracy Formulates a Game Plan on Marihuana
By the end of 1929 both the Bureau of Prohibition and the surgeon general's office had received numerous congressional inquiries. Each '.sked the obvious question—why not include marihuana in the basic federal antinarcotics legislation? And S. 2075, as we noted above, was introduced by Senator Sheppard of Texas. Yet the narcotics bureaucracy did not wish to amend the Harrison Act to include marihuana and did not want Congress to pass S. 2075.
The scientific and medical establishment did not object to the prohibition of marihuana. This is clear from a report of the surgeon general issued in 1929. Prepared at the instance of Senator Phipps and in response to the new departures of the 1929 act, Dr. Cummings' Preliminary Report on Indian Hemp and Peyote com-bines textbook pharmacology and popular myth.
In a brief statement, which will be analyzed in detail in chapter 7, the surgeon general simply summarized the folklore surrounding the drug. Apart from a methodical elaboration of "The Toxic Effects of Cannabis Sativa" in language similar to that employed in the pharmacological literature, the report was notably unscientific and impressionistic. Habitual users, Cummings noted," are said to" develop a delirious rage during which they are liable to commit violent crimes. Support for this was drawn from the Eastern hashish myths. Similarly, his report stated without any further elaboration at all that the prolonged use of "this narcotic is said to produce mental deterioration." Finally, the document reflected consider-able confusion regarding the drug's dependence liability, noting the absence of the type of physical symptoms associated with depen-dence on the opiates but attributing marihuana's narcotic and habit-forming nature to the "stimulating effects obtained and the individual satisfaction experienced through the temporary inflation of the personality."
In sum, the surgeon general concluded that marihuana was "definitely" a narcotic, and lent official credence to the notions that it was addictive, criminogenic, and insanity-producing. No firsthand study was either attempted or recommended; the Prelimi-nary Report was apparently considered a sufficient study of the situation. In fact, the Narcotics Division dissuaded a pharmacology professor from the University of North Dakota from engaging in any research in May 1930 because "we know all about [marihuana's] physiological, toxic, and pharmacological properties."21 We have no doubt, then, that there were no scientific objections to the inclusion of marihuana in the basic federal narcotics legislation.
Nor were there any political objections. Because of the local, ethnic nature of the phenomenon, there was no active nationwide political interest in such legislation. But, by the same token, there was no political impediment. In the Preliminary Report, Cummings accurately noted that the prohibitory laws enacted in the border states "reflect the state of public opinion along the Rio Grande, both on the American and the Mexican sides, where the majority of people are opposed to use and abuse of this narcotic." As we noted in chapter 2, the popular image of marihuana as a "narcotic" and its social identity with Mexicans, blacks, and whites of bad moral character predisposed criminal legislation.
It is clear that the Public Health Service and the Prohibition Bureau would have preferred to eliminate the smoking of mari-huana. Some staff members felt more strongly than others. But there was a legal objection to the proposed legislation. Opinion was virtually unanimous that the inclusion of cannabis in the Harrison and Import and Export acts was illogical, possibly unconstitutional, and might even endanger the entire federal legislative scheme which experts viewed as the most effective in the world.
Of the legal objections to amendment of the Harrison Act, the most important related to the medical utility of marihuana. Viola-tion of the Harrison Act arose from the failure to register, pay, or otherwise comply with its provisions taxing legitimate (i.e., medical) transactions. The act rendered all nonmedical traffic illegal. Congress chose to cast this act as a revenue-producing act because, under the prevailing interpretation of the constitutional scheme allocating power between the state and federal governments, only the states had power to regulate directly the practice of medicine, including the local distribution and possession of narcotics. These activities, unless they involved interstate commerce, were beyond the direct.legislative cognizance of Congress. So, by using the taxing power Congress was aiming to regulate medical and pharmaceutical practice, not to raise revenues.
When the Supreme Court upheld the act by a five-to-four margin in 19'19, it emphasized that the favorable decision depended largely on the fact that the law did produce substantial revenue, notwith-standing its "incidental" effect in restricting narcotic use. But wide variations in potency had by now undermined therapeutic interest in cannabis, and little or no revenue could be derived from a stabile purporting to tax legitimate (medical) use of this drug. Thus, as applied to marihuana, this kind of statutory framework would probably have been held unconstitutional. Further; since the Harrison Act itself had been upheld by so narrow a margin, the bureau was not eager for any further litigation in the Supreme Court.
The ease with which marihuana could be cultivated compelled the federal narcotics chiefs also to oppose S. 2075, Senator Sheppard's bill that sought to include cannabis in the Import and Export Act. Since Congress did not have power under prevailing constitutional doctrine directly to prohibit possession of any com-modity, it used its jurisdiction over foreign commerce in the Import and Export Act as a means to prohibit local possession in much the same way that it had used the taxing power in the Harrison Act as a means to regulate the distribution of narcotics. Under Section 2f of the Import and Export Act, possession was made presump-tive evidence of concealment of drugs illegally imported in violation of the act. A. L. Tennyson, the legal adviser to the commissioner of prohibition, contended that such a presumption of illegal importation would be irrational, hence unconstitutional, as applied to marihuana because hemp was so easily grown throughout the United States.22 As with the Harrison Act, Tennyson was con-cerned that an attack on Section 2f as applied to marihuana would endanger the presumption as applied to cocaine and opium.
There were dissenting views to this reasoning. One official in the Bureau of Prohibition thought that there were already too many statutes, that some immediate restrictions were imperative, and that both acts should be amended to include cannabis in the definition of "habit-forming drugs."23
On 28 June 1930 the narcotics bureaucracy's objection to S. 2075 was transmitted to the Senate Finance Committee by Harry J. Anslinger, in his capacity as secretary to the Federal Narcotics Control Board.24 The bill then died in committee. But this was not the end of the affair. The narcotics experts had suc-cessfully resisted the initial congressional effort to enact federal legislation prohibiting marihuana; but these deliberations had aroused their interest and therefore left an important legacy.
Government experts were now of two minds. Some believed that marihuana use was essentially a local problem in a few areas 6f the country, that it probably would remain confined, and that federal legislation would not be much help anyway since effective control could only be achieved on the state and local levels. This view, held by the assistant surgeon general in charge of narcotics, by the deputy commissioner of prohibition, L. G. Nutt, and by the regal adviser for the bureau, A. L. Tennyson, is probably best reflected in the bureau's letter dated 25 January 1929, drafted by Tennyson and signed by Nutt, which opposed Senator Phipp's suggested amendment of the Harrison Act:
[The] evils represented by the abuse of cannabis indica . . . do not appear to be nearly as widespread as those connected with the possession of opium, cocoa leaves or their derivatives, the former being confined to the southwest and midwest states and possibly in some of the larger cities. It is thought that this evil may more properly be met by state and municipal legislation, for which there is more ample fundamental authority. I respect-fully venture the suggestion that if the abuse of cannabis indica ... exists to an appreciable extent in Colorado, the matter be re-ferred to the state legislature for appropriate attention.2-5
Those opposed to federal legislation were also skeptical of the horrors "said to be associated with [marihuana's) abuse" and they were not eager to tangle with the AMA and the pharmaceutical industry, a fate they considered inevitable if tight controls were to be obtained.26
Others who were convinced that "abuse of the drug far exceeds its use as a medicine" were inclined to believe the allegations of crime and insanity and hoped to see that the drug was "absolutely outlawed." This would require a three-pronged plan: complete federal prohibition of importation and exportation (by separate statute); federal prohibition of interstate transportation; and com-prehensive, uniform state laws restricting or prohibiting growth, sale, and possession.27
The important issues raised by these proposals, which were advocated by Anslinger and J. M. Doran, retiring commissioner of prohibition, were whether there was any medical need for cannabis and, if so, whether this need could be met by other drugs. If there was a medical need which cannot otherwise be met, could it be satisfied by domestically grown hemp?
In the course of developing the departmental position on S.2075, Anslinger had solicited responses to those and related questions. Among the respondents were the American Drug Manufacturers' Association and the American Medical Association. The AMA was not enthusiastic about the prospect of greater governmental inter-ference with the medical profession and the pharmaceutical industry. Also it expressed resentment over the implicit suggestion that physicians and manufacturers were responsible for cannabis "abuse," a charge which had been made quite explicitly by Agriculture's R. F. Smith in 1917.
Dr. William C. Woodward, director of AMA's Bureau of Legal Medicine, did not mince any words in his response. He indicted the arrogance of those in the federal narcotics bureaucracy who could contemplate a wholesale alteration of the legal status of cannabis without consulting all the interested parties in the private sector. He thought he saw a fait accompli and he was very nearly right:
Before your letter was referred to this bureau, it was referred to our Council on Pharmacy and Chemistry, and when it was referred to me, I was informed that that Council had never had occasion to give consideration to the questions you raise. The same might be said to be true generally with reference to this bureau; it has never had occasion to give consideration to most of the questions raised by your letter, and I doubt whether any other agency, public or private, has ever had occasion to do so, unless it be the United States Department of Agriculture and the several analogous departments of the state governments. I pre-sume that you have, of course, communicated with the United States Department of Agriculture, and if you have not com-municated with the several analogous state departments, it might be worth your while to do so.
Dr. Woodward's outrage is matched only by his sarcasm:
Undertaking to answer so far as practicable your specific questions, the following information is offered in response to the particular questions propounded by you:
I What is the quantity of Indian Hemp produced in the United States? Ans. — The American Medical Association has no knowledge with respect to this matter.
II What is the geographical distribution of the areas where Indian Hemp is grown within the United States? Ans. — The American Medical Association has no information with respect to this matter except such as may be found in books and journals, with which information, it is presumed, you are already familiar.
III What are the medical needs and uses of the drug or drugs produced from Indian Hemp? Ans. — The answer to this question can be found in standard books on pharmacology and thera-peutics, which are available in large numbers in the Surgeon General's library in Washington.
IV What is the comparative medical value of Indian Hemp as domestically produced and as produced in foreign countries? Ans. — The answer to this question can be found in standard books on pharmacology and therapeutics, which are available in large numbers in the Surgeon General's library in Washington.28
In the course of exploring the feasibility of including cannabis in a uniform State Narcotic Drug Act—which the AMA had been working on in earnest since 1922—Dr. Woodward had conducted a survey of the pharmaceutical interests during the later 1920s. To his own amazement, he reported, all but one of the responses challenged the accepted view that cannabis was "habit-forming." Many of the respondents cited a 1925 Canal Zone study which concluded that marihuana presented insufficient danger to public health or safety to warrant its prohibition. No respondents reported any knowledge of the abusive use of pharmaceutical products. They felt that even if this were possible, most cannabis was sold for compound preparations whose abuse would be farfetched, that the medicinal use of cannabis had declined substantially, that its intoxicant use was not enough of a problem to justify the red tape which the medical profession and drug industry would have to suffer should major controls be imposed. They further suggested that the passage of legislation would only call attention to cannabis which might well cause abuse where there was now none. Finally, they b-elieved that attempts to regulate the distribution of cannabis would be completely irrelevant to the control of any illegitimate use because the drug would then "come direct from the soil and not through drug channels."
In their response to Anslinger, the Drug Manufacturers' Associa-tion echoed these arguments. The only way to prevent smoking would be to eliminate domestic growth, and the federal govern-ment could not do that.29 But the corollary point, that domestic production was sufficient to satisfy whatever medical need existed, had important implications for federal legislation. Thus, although opposing S. 2075, Anslinger told the chairman of the Finance Committee that "there would be no objection to the enactment of a separate measure prohibiting the importation and exportation of this particular drug."3°
Just about the time of this decision to oppose S. 2075 but not to oppose separate legislation, there was a change in the federal narcotics bureaucracy that was to have a major impact on the course of future marihuana legislation. On 14 June 1930 Congress abolished the Federal Narcotics Control Board, which had been established by the Import and Export Act, and transferred its duties, along with the responsibilities of the narcotics division of the Bureau of Prohibition, to a new Federal Bureau of Narcotics, to be housed in the Treasury Department. The birth of this separate agency, eager to fulfill its role as a crusader against the evils of narcotics, was as important as any other single factor in influenc-ing public policy toward drugs from 1930 to 1968.
Then, on 15 July 1930 Harry Jacob Anslinger was appointed acting commissioner of the new bureau, an appointment that became permanent on 12 August. A man who would single-handedly control U.S. drug policy for three decades, Anslinger had taken a fortuitous route to his new post. Born in 1892 in Altoona, Pennsylvania, Anslinger entered the U.S. Foreign Service as the clouds of war were gathering over Europe. After several postwar assignments to The Hague, Hamburg, and Venezuela, he headed the U.S. consulate in the Bahamas. In this post he prevailed upon British authorities to aid the prohibition experiment then under-way at home by halting the bootleg liquor traffic originating in the West Indies.
It was at this point, in 1926, that Anslinger's career took its fateful twist. His diplomatic assistance to the cause of prohibition apparently came to the attention of the Treasury Department, which immediately borrowed his services from the State Depart-ment to serve as the chief of the Prohibition Bureau's Divisioq of Foreign Control. In 1929 Anslinger was promoted to the post of assistant commissioner of prohibition and was designated secre-tary to the Narcotics Control Board. It was in this latter position that he was introduced to the more durable area of narcotics policy and participated in the initial departmental decision-making on marihuana.
Until 1930 federal narcotics policy fell under the jurisdiction of L. G. Nutt, deputy commissioner of prohibition. Nutt would pre-sumably have been in line for an appointment to head the new bureau had it not been for a scandal uncovered in early 1930 involving federal narcotics agents. A federal grand jury found that New York agents had falsified their records, reporting local police arrests as federal arrests; there was also some evidence of collusion between the federal agents and illegal traffickers. In any event, Anslinger took over Nutt's responsibilities in the narcotics division, continuing at the helm of the new bureau.
Soon after the Senate confirmed his appointment on 18 Decem-ber 1930 Commissioner Anslinger decided that the bureau's first major project should be an active involvement in the drafting of the Uniform State Narcotic Drug Act, an endeavor then in its fourth year. Because prohibition of growth was essential to com-bating marihuana, the Uniform Act was an ideal vehicle for securing comprehensive state legislation. Also, since the drafting of the Uniform Act could be conducted away from public debate, it seemed the best forum for confronting the medical profession and pharmaceutical industry. The federal aspects of the marihuana plan would be deferred and the case could be presented to Congress "at the appropriate time."31
Pressure from Prosecutors
Ironically, soon after this decision was made agitation for federal legislation began to increase among certain private pressure groups, particularly the law enforcement community. Most of the discon-tent tame from New Orleans, where, apparently, it had been ignited by a significant increase in the local crime rate during the late 1920s. Although "payroll and bank guards were doubled," this "did not prevent some of the most spectacular holdups in the history of the city."32 Probably tied to the widespread violation of alcohol prohibition, the crime increase was nonetheless attributed to the convenient scapegoat, marihuana, and local officials took highly visible steps to implicate the alien drug. A local physician, Dr. Fossier, indicted the "marihuana menace." He surveyed local "experts" in order to document the thesis that "muggle-heads" fortified themselves with marihuana as a prelude to violence. He reported that the local coroner found 125 confirmed users of marihuana among 450 prisoners.33 On the basis of Fossier's article and the surgeon general's 1929 report, the local district attorney, Eugene Stanley, who had been instrumental in closing the New Orleans morphine clinics a decade earlier, began to campaign for federal marihuana legislation. He circulated a pamphlet drawing heavily on Dr. Fossier's article, and he addressed numerous local organizations. Using the "assassin" myths to set the stage, he offered a sweeping assertion which was to be reproduced in practically every commentary on marihuana published during the 1930s:
It is an ideal drug to cut off inhibitions quickly. . . .
At the present time the underworld has been quick to realize the value of this drug in subjugating the will of human derelicts to that of a master mind. Its use sweeps away all restraint, and to its influence may be attributed many of our present-day crimes. It has been the experience of the Police and Prosecuting Officials in the South that immediately before the commission of many crimes the use of marihuana cigarettes has been indulged in by criminals so as to relieve themselves from the natural restraint which might deter them from the commission of criminal acts, and to give them the false courage necessary to commit the contemplated crime.34
No empirical data were offered in support of this contention. A habit so menacing, he continued, obviously could not be eliminated by local action alone:
Inasmuch as the harmful effects of the use of marihuana are daily becoming more widely known and since it has been classed as a narcotic by the statutory laws of seventeen American States, England and Mexico, and since persons addicted to its use have been made eligible for treatment in the United States Narcotic Farhis, the United States Government will unquestionably be compelled to adopt a consistent attitude towards it, and include it in the Harrison Anti-narcotic Law, so as to give Federal aid to the States in their effort to suppress a traffic as deadly and as destructive to society as that in the other forms of narcotics now prohibited by this Act.35
Stanley's campaign did not go unnoticed either locally or nationally. A typical illustration of its success is the following letter to President Hoover from George Doyle, vice-president of Local No. 93 of the Operative Plasterers' and Cement Finishers' Inter-national Association, and formerly deputy U.S. marshall of the eastern district of Louisiana:
I beg to call your attention same time asking your kindly cboperation and assistance to suppress the use of a dirty and dangerous weed commonly known as Marihuana or Muggles. [T] he weed is a product from (Mexico) and has done more harm to the young generation than morphine, opium, or cocaine.
[I] t has an influence of creating false courage amongst our young criminals and bandits and hold up bankrobbers even cold blood murders of recent status of two holdups of brances of the canal bank. [A] s one who is very interested in our community welfare I would ask if you kindly recommend to Congress or some members of the House of Representatives to amend the Harrison narcotics act. . . .36
The local press took up the cry. They were quick to imply a causal relationship between marihuana and crime on the flimsiest of evidence. The following 1931 news report was headlined:
The essential text of the report was:
Robert Jacques, 18, testified . . . that he fired a shot under an "impulse of the moment" which seriously wounded [an acquaintance] .
The judge sentenced Jacques to . . . 1 8 months to 3 -Years, declaring that "it's time we put a stop to these dangerous impulses."
Jacques was arrested the day after the shooting. . . . A revol-ver was found in his pocket as were some marihuana cigarettes.37
During the height of Stanley's campaign, an FBN agent in the New Orleans division forwarded Stanley's pamphlet to Commis-sioner Anslinger. He added that Stanley had been trying to mobilize public opinion "to compel the Federal Government to have a law passed with respect to marihuana similar to the anti-narcotics statute."38 Anslinger was in Geneva, but Acting Commis-sioner Wood answered that there were many medical and agricultural questions to be resolved before the federal government could consider legislation. It "would be appreciated if the substance of these views were communicated to Mr. Stanley."39
But Stanley was not alone. Prohibition's legacy of lawlessness, together with the economic woes of the depression, found an uncertain America drawing into itself; the nation sought to preserve its strength and no longer sap it in the pursuit of diversity. As in previous times of crisis and national anxiety, a latent xenophobia surfaced, as pleas were heard for immigration restriction to reduce both the labor force and the crime rate as well. The perceived relationship between immigrants and crime is reflected in the fact that the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (the Wickersham Commission), appointed by President Hoover in 1929, devoted an entire reseaxch volume to a "Report on Crime and the Foreign Born."4° Much of this volume, in turn, was de-voted to an examination of the incidence of criminality among Mexicans.41 Anti-Mexican feeling was running high; and the Wickersham research was undoubtedly triggered by a widely shared belief that Mexican laborers were responsible for a dis-proportionate number of violent crimes.42
Marihuana, the Mexican loco weed, was a convenient scapegoat once the crime thesis, bolstered by the assassin myth, had been un-leashed. Law enforcement officials, in concert with the press, were eager to use it in order to explain increases in crime within their jurisdictions. In many areas of the country the cry went up for bans on marihuana (and sometimes for bans on Mexican immigra-tion). For example, state and federal legislation were said to be necesgary to complement the local ordinance recently adopted by the city of Tulsa, Oklahoma. Twin fears were raised—contamination of youth and incitement of crime. A Tulsa county attorney asserted:43
The general use of the drug among young people is making it imperative that the state or the government of the United States take immediate steps to cope with this deadly drug, the dope which is used by murderers.
In some eastern cities, it has been learned, the gunman has discovered that the weed offers him something new in the way of courage—courage to kill.
It is notoriously a fact, authorities point out, that gunmen, who occupy the lowest levels in the ranks of crime, are usually cowards. To undertake murder, they need something to "pep them up." A few whiffs of a marihuana cigarette, mixed with tobacco and he loses all sense of fear.
"Crime is on the increase in Denver," reported the Rocky Moun-ain News on 27 September 1931, and one of the major causes is the "spread of the use of marihuana—the deadly Indian hemp which, during the past year, has virtually supplanted cocaine, morphine, heroin and opium among drug addicts." The paper had been so advised by the manager of safety, Carl Millikin.44 Denver was fertile ground for the crime thesis. Even in 1929, when mari-huana was perceived to be confined to Mexicans, the press did not hesitate to attribute criminal tendencies to the new immigrants and their weed. The Denver Post gave front-page attention to the violent death of a young girl, allegedly murdered by her Mexican stepfather on 7 April 1929. The story was lead news in the Denver Post every day until 16 April, in part because the girl's mother was white. On the 16th it first mentioned that the accused might have been a marihuana user. Headllned "Fiend Slayer Caught in Nebraska [;] Mexican Confesses Torture of American Baby," and subheaded "Prisoner Admits to Officer he is Marihuana Addict," the story relates in full the conclusive evidence:
"You smoke marihuana?"
The Mexican said he had been without the weed for two days before the killing of his stepdaughter.
On 17 April the story on the Mexican included the following: "He repeated the story he had told the Sidney Chief of Police regarding his addiction to marihuana saying that his supply of the weed4had become exhausted several days before the killing and his nerves were unstrung."45
Four days later the governor signed a bill increasing the penalties for second-offense possession, sale, or production of marihuana.46
Naturally a perceived increase in marihuana use in 1931, especi-ally among the young, provided a convenient explanation for an increase in crime generally and juvenile crime in particular. The Rocky Mountain News noted: "Marihuana, until a comparatively recent date, has been used almost exclusively by the Mexican population employed in the beetfields. Today, however, this deadly narcotic . . . has found its way into the very heart of society.Boys and girls of tender years .. . use it to `get a thrill'; criminals smoke it to gain courage for their lawless deeds; drug addicts have adopted it because of its cheapness."
Millikin had no doubt about the ill effects of the weed: insanity ("consumed over any period of time, [it] drives the user insane and leads to an early grave") and murder ("Full of the drug and the wild dreams that go with it, [the user] is just as likely to commit murder as anything else"). He also had no doubt about the pre-scription—a feverish publicity campaign to awake the citizenry. Even though marihuana prohibition was already on the books, Millikin emphasized that "countless thousands of Denver citizens know nothing of marihuana or its effects."47
An oft-cited article which reiterated the crime and insanity theses during this period appeared in 1932. Written by M. A. Hayes and L. E. Bowery (a member of the Wichita, Kansas, Police Depart-ment), the article was published in The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology.
Hayes and Bowery explicitly attributed the introduction and diffusion of the marihuana evil to Mexicans, noting that "so long as it was confined to Mexicans themselves, [it] was not generally noticed." But when it began to spread to "native whites" around 1925 (presumably in New Orleans), it became "a menace of in-creasing importance and one against which the battle has just begun." From contemporary newspaper accounts, particularly in Kansas, the authors documented their assertion that marihuana use was widespread among students, who preferred the weed to alcohol and had begun to throw marihuana parties. Whether or not use had indeed,become so widespread, the description confirms the picture emerging from other contemporary accounts. The justification for further legislation lay -not only in the increase in use but also in the effects of the drug itself. The authors contended that marihuana is the most dangerous of all drugs, mainly because of the volatility of the second, or "exhilaration," phase of intoxication, where "the barrier of control over the emotions is lowered and the smoker may commence to boast, shout or dance. Any contradictions or restraint now offered may excite a state of frenzy leading to actions of uncontrollable violence or even murder." As an example, the authors offered a quotation from the chief of detectives of the Los Angeles Police Department, culled from an article in the Fraternal Order of Police Journal: "In the past we have had officers of this department shot and killed by marihuana addicts and have traced the act of murder directly to the influence of Marihuana, with no other motive. Numerous assaults have been made upon officers and citizens with intent to kill by Marihuana addicts which were directly traceable to the influence of Marihuana."
Also during the exhilaration phase, Hayes and Bowery main-tained, the user is capable of "feats of great strength and endurance, during which no fatigue is felt." They suggested that this phenome-non provided a physiological basis for Stanley's claim "that criminals often prime themselves with marihuana before starting on an enterprise, for they lose all sense of fear and are prepared to take any risk." The authors offered further examples from "case studies" compiled from interviews. The following is typical:
A Mexican, under the influence, while going beneath a railroad viaduct imagined that he saw approaching him, at great speed, a rider on an enormous horse. Dodging behind a column for pro-tection, when he looked out again, he realized that what he had seen was an old woman pullmg a small wagon. Going home, despite the fact that his wife had that day given birth to a child, he compelled her to get out of bed and prepare his dinner. Still suffering from the characteristic hallucinations, as she was peel-ing an onion, he imagined that she was preparing to attack him, and seized a club and hit her in the head with such foree that she was knocked unconscious.
During the exhilaration phase, they stated, "sexual desires are stimulated and may lead to unnatural acts, such as indecent exposure and rape." To support this proposition the authors. first cited a 1926 Chicago Herald-Examiner newspaper account: " 'A Kansas hasheesh eater thinks he is a white elephant. Six months ago they found him strolling alone a road, a few miles out of Topeka. He was naked, his clothing strewn along the highway for a mile. He was not violently insane, but crazy—said he was an elephant and acted as much like one as his limited physique would let him. Marihuana did it.' "
Another of the "case histories" provided the only other "support":
F, age twenty-two, with a long police record, states that at one time he was a user, but that upon becoming acquainted with the evil, ceased its use. He said further that it caused him to suffer weird hallucinations, and to commit acts he would not normally have considered. F reported several instances of which he claimed to have positive knowledge, where boys had induced girls to use the weed for the purpose of seducing them. He reports that its use is prevalent among members of the National Guard.
Investigators' note: While he claims to have ceased its use, this young man has all the appearances of a weed-head with the symptoms given by medical authorities.
With respect to the effects of long-term use, the authors felt so little doubt that they provided only one supporting statistic:
It is impossible to fix a definite time in which one becomes an addict. . . . After the chronic use of marihuana "cannabi-nomania" develops, which in many persons, especially if psycho-pathic, leads to a loss of mental activity. . . . [E] ach [smoking] experience ends in the destruction of brain tissues and nerve centers, and does irreparable damage. If continued, the inevitable result is insanity, which those familiar with it describe as absolutely incurable, and, without exception ending in death. Statistics show that from seventeen to twenty percent of all males admitted to mental hospitals and asylums in India have become insane through the use of this drug.
The Hayes—Bowery article typifies the allegedly scientific ac-counts distributed to propagandists, newspapers, and policy makers during,,this period. Like Stanley's article it did not go unnoticed. Both were frequently cited in judicial opinions and FBN literature4.9
It should be apparent that the law enforcement community, with ready access to the public print, exerted a major influence on public opinion toward marihuana in the late twenties and early thirties. From an ascending crime rate and anti-Mexican bias emerged a pressure for marihuana prohibition which the FBN chose to divert to the state legislatures. This public opinion process is best illustrated by the FBN response to the two studies of Mexicans and crime prepared for the Wickersham Commission and published in late 1931 in the commission's final volume "Crime and the Foreign Born."
The commission-sponsored analysis of criminal justice data in several regions of the country tended to confirm, in most cases, the overrepresentation of Mexicans in the categories of arrests, convictions, and prisoner populations. These data were interpreted at length by Dr. Paul Taylor, associate professor of economics at the University of California, who accounted for the statistical association in terms of unequal and unfair administration of the law.5° A further study of "Crime and Criminal Justice Among the Mexicans of Illinois" was contributed by Paul L. Warnshuis, head of the western branch of the Presbyterian Board of National Missions (with headquarters in Denver), whose answers to the ques-tion "Is the Mexican really criminally inclined?" reflect the paternalism of one who can find many "natural causes" for the Mexican's many "difficulties in being a law-abiding citizen." Along with differences in custom and manner of life, economic depriva-tion, and "well-known faults in our system of law enforcement and criminal justice," Warnshuis implicated marihuana: "Those who know the Mexican . . . would be certain to blame marihuana for a portion of the Mexican arrests. . . ."51
Warnshuis' views about marihuana, which correlated perfectly with prevailing myths, added legitimacy to the crime thesis. In a passage which came to the personal attention of Commissioner Anslinger,52 Warnshuis noted:
There are two other factors which no doubt play no unimportant role in bringing about the arrest of many Mexicans. The first is drunkenness. . . . A second factor is marihuana. In the South-western states and in Mexico, marihuana is known as "loco" weed—that is, "crazy"—because of the effect it produces. It is used for making cigarettes, and is not only a powerful drug, but to all appearances renders the user either drunk or crazy. 'The South Chicago police told of one Mexican who needed four officers to subdue him. It is especially insidious because it causes the brain and nervous system to deteriorate. To what extent it is being used it is impossible to learn, because those using it, like morphine and cocaine addicts, are secretive. Its use is not con-fined to Mexicans only, for within the past year four youths of other nationalities charged with a series of robberies admitted that they had to get "loaded" with marihuana before they could stage their nightly forays.53
Engaged in drafting the Uniform State Narcotic Drug Act, and having some trouble persuading the medical community to include a cannabis provision, Commissioner Anslinger seized on the Wickersham study as grounds for a country-wide ban on the drug. In September 1931 antimarihuana crusaders apparently planted a story in the Christian Science Monitor which publicized these isolated marihuana "findings" under the heading:
Drug Used by Mexican Aliens Finds Loophole in U.S. Laws SPREAD OF GROWTH OF MARIHUANA IN WAKE OF IMMIGRANTS CAUSES GRAVE CONCERN AT WASHINGTON-EFFECTS DESCRIBED IN WICKERSHAM STUDIES.54
Then, in October, Anslinger attempted to bring public pressure to bear on the commissioners and publicly endorsed the crime thesis (for the first time, as far as we can tell): "Instances of criminals using the drug to give them courage before making brutal forays are occurrences commonly known to the narcotic bureau."55
Anslinger's purpose in going to the press at this time is quite apparent. He had decided that there was no legitimate medical use of the drug, that allowing such use would merely open a gigantic loophole in the law, and that, accordingly, the essential first step was for each state to enact a total ban on cultivation, sale, and posstssion of marihuana. To implement this, the FBN had just proposed such a provision to the Conference of Commissioners for Uniform State Laws. The bureau proposal had been defeated, however, by the medical-pharmaceutical interests. Consequently, Anslinger took his case to the press.
Although at least twenty-five states had prohibitory legislation by this time, the commissioner grossly misstated the alleged in-adequacy of state law, contending that only two, California and Texas, had "restrictive legislation." "Elsewhere," he noted, "the situation is shocking, to say the least." Anslinger went on to state, apparently in exaggeration: "I have several stacks of corres-pondence from various parts of the country urging that some steps be taken by the Federal Government." But he had already deter-mined to resist the growing pressure for federal legislation and to focus instead on inserting an adequate cannabis provision in the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act. Wanting to galvanize the conference of commissioners, but not yet wanting to seek federal legislation, the bureau took a calmly preventive line, as is illustrated by the following official statement which was issued in early 1932:
A great deal of public interest has been aroused by newspaper articles appearing from time to time on the evils of the abuse of marihuana, or Indian hemp, and more attention has been focused on specific cases reported of the abuse of the drug than would otherwise have been the case. This publicity tends to magnify the extent of the evil and lends color to an inference that there is an alarming spread of the improper use of the drug, whereas the actual increase in such use may not have been inordinately large.56
Marihuana was a highly dangerous drug, the bureau agreed, but its use was not of such proportions that federal legislation was t needed.
1. Treasury Decision 35719, 25 Sept. 1915.
2. Ch. 348, 44 Stat. 138 (1927); see Schmeckbier, The Bureau of Prohibition, Brookings Institute for Govemment Research Service Monograph, no. 57 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1929), p. 143.
3. Act of 14 June 1930, ch. 488, 46 Stat. 585.
4. Act of 19 Jan. 1929, ch. 82, §5, 45 Stat. 1085.
6. Act of 14 June 1930, Pub. L. no. 71-357,§4 (a).
6. "1917 Investigation."
7. U.S., Treasury Department, United States Special Narcotic Committee, Traffic in Narcotic Drugs, Report of Special Committee of Investigation Appointed March 25, 1918, by the Secretary of the Treasury (Washing-ton, D.C.: GPO, 1919).
8. Kolb and Dumez, "The Prevalence and Trend of Drug Addiction in the United States and Factors Influencing It," Public Health Reports, May 1924.
See generally A. H. Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, 1900-1939 (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1969), pp. 82-145.
10. Act of 26 May 1922, ch. 202, 42 Stat. 596.
11. O'Connor to W. O. Hart, Bureau of Prohibition, forwarded to Colonel L. C. Nutt, deputy commissioner of Prohibition, 18 Dec. 1928.
12. Act of 19 Jan. 1929, ch. 82, § 5, 45 Stat. 1085.
13. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Hearings on H.R. 12781, H.R. 13645, 70th Cong., 1st sess., 1928, H. Rept. 1652.
14. Wright, "The International Opium Conference," American Journal of Inter-national Law, 6 (1912), 871. One historian has suggested that the United States delegation favored inclusion of cannabis in the 1912 convention (Musto, "The Marihuana Tax Act of 1937," Archives of General Psychiatry, 26 , 102).
15. Addendum and Final Protocol of the International Opium Conference, The Hague, 1912, quoted in W. Willoughby, Opium as an International Problem (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1925), p. 492.
16. Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, "Report to Council on the Work of the Sixth Session," quoted in Willoughby, p. 374.
17. See Willoughby, p. 251.
18. League of Nations Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, "Position in Regard to Indian Hemp," Doc. no. 0.C. 1542(a), 4 July 1934.
19. Quoted in Willoughby, p. 539.
20. Vandenberg to surgeon general, 10 Sept. 1929.
21. Dr. Walter L. Treadway, Division of Mental Hygiene, Public Health Service, to G. A. Talbert, 27 May 1930.
22. Draft response from Tennyson to request by Senate Finance Committee for Treasury Department views on S. 2075, 25 Nov. 1929.
23. Memorandum from Rhees to H. J. Anslinger, secretary of Federal Narcotics Control Board, 15 Jan. 1930.
24. Anslinger to Reed Smoot, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee,
28 June 1930.
25. Nutt to Phipps, 25 Jan. 1929.
26. Nutt to Phipps, 4 Jan. 1930.
27. Doran to John M. Killet, federal district judge, Northern District of Ohio,
10 Jan. 1930; Anslinger to Smoot, 28 June 1930.
28. Woodward to Anslinger, 28 Apr. 1930.
29. Dr. F. O. Taylor, Special Committee of American Drug Manufacturer's Association, to Anslinger, 2 May 1930.
30. Anslinger to Smoot, 28 June 1930.
31. Anslinger to Joseph T. Swim, California narcotics chemist, 20 Aug. 1930.
32. F. R. Gomila and M. C. Gomila Lambow, "Present Status of the Marihuana Vice in the United States," in Marihuana: America's New Drug Probletn, ed. R. Walton (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1938), p. 31.
33. A. E. Fossier, "The Marihuana Menace," New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, 84 (1931), 247-52.
34. E. Stanley, "Marihuana as a Developer of Criminals," American Journal of Police Science, 2 (1931), 256.
35. Ibid., p. 257. It should be noted that Mr. Stanley's scientific bibliography was
drawn entirely from Fossier's article, and we can presume that Mr. Stanley did not read these references himself. In addition to numerous medical dictionaries and pharmacplogy texts, the bibliography included a substantial number of foreign studies of cannabis intoxication. Interestingly enough, it also cited the Report of The Indian Hemp Drug Commission of 1893-94, whose conclusions had been diametrically opposed to the views expressed in the article. For some discussion of the state of scientific knowledge at this time, see chapter 7.
36. Doyle to Hoover, 24 Jan. 1931.
37. New Orleans Times-Picayune, 4 Jan. 1930, article attached to letter fr:Sin
Congressman Oscar De Prest of Illinois to L. C. Nutt, 13 Feb. 1930.
38. J. B. Greeson, Narcotics agent-in-charge, New Orleans Division, to Anslinger,
29 June 1931.
39. Will S. Wood to Greeson, 11 July 1931.
40. Taylor, "Crime and the Foreign Born," Wickersham Report, no. 10.
41. Ibid., pp. 199-329.
42. Ibid., p. 407; Taylor, "More Bars Against Mexicans?" The Survey, 64 (1930),
43. Newspaper article dated "1931" and headlined "Marihuana, Deadly Drug, As Yet Unregulated by United States State Law," in the files of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.
44. Rocky Mountain News, 27 Sept. 1931.
45. Denver Post, 16 Apr. 1929, p. 2; 17 Apr. 1929, p. 2.
46. Denver Post, 21 Apr. 1929; Colorado, Colorado Laws (1929), ch. 93.
47. Rocky Mountain News, 27 Sept. 1931.
48. Hayes and Bowery, "Marihuana," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 23 (1932), 1086-94.
49. See, e.g., State v. Navaro, 83 Utah 6, 14-15, 26 P.2d 955, 958 (1933).
50. Taylor, "Crime and the Foreign Bom," Wickersham Report, no. 10, pp. 199- 243. Dr. Taylor summarizes his findings on p. 242: "The statistical record of law violations presented is on the whole, and in varying degrees, somewhat unfavorable to Mexicans. This seems true, although in places their record is distinctly favorable. But the use of statistics of arrests or convictions is open to serious criticism because racial antipathies and political and economic helplessness of Mexicans swell the figures of their apparent criminality. Mere conflict of codes, too, has the same effect. While the United States sustains some shock from this conflict with the code brought with him by the immigrant, it is not to be concluded therefrom that the immigrant is of an inherently criminal breed." Although Dr. Taylor did not mention marihuana in this connection, his article did refer several times to the fact that Mexican laborers were spreading the practice of marihuana-smoking.
51. Warshuis, "Crime and Criminal Justice Among the Mexicans of Illinois," Wickersham Report, no. 10, pp. 265-329.
52. In a handwritten memorandum, "Subject—Marihuana," 17 Sept. 1931, Anslinger indicated his personal attention to "Wickersham Commission Report on Crime and the Foreign Born, pages 205, 281 and 381."
53. Wickersham Report, no. 10, pp. 280-281.
54. Christian Science Monitor, 12 Sept. 1931.
55. Christian Science Monitor, 3 Oct. 1931.
56. U.S., Treasury Department, Bureau of Narcotics, Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs for the Year ended, December 31, 1931 (Washington, D.C.:GPO, 1932), p. 51