Primary emphasis within the international movement to deal with the abuse of dangerous drugs has been given to limiting the supplies of drugs available. Down to 1939 international measures dealt mainly with the regulation of the national and international legitimate trade, the suppression of illicit traffic, and the prevention of the production of surplus supplies of manufactured drugs. One area not adequately covered was the production of raw materials. This accounted for a major gap in the international system of control. Limitation of the supplies available could not be achieved unless limitation began at the source, with restricting the cultivation of the raw plants. In the Ameri-can view, this was the basic problem, and it was the last to be tackled seriously by the international community.
In all of the international conferences held during the period under study §ome attention had been given to the necessity of limiting the quantities of raw material available for consumption and for use in the production of refined drugs. The Hague Convention had imposed upon its adherents the obligation to enact effective laws and regulations to control the production and distribution of raw opium, but no specific measures by which this was to be achieved or internationally supervised were stipulated. One of the reasons the United States withdrew from the Geneva Conference of 1924-1925 was the refusal of the producing countries to commit themselves to definite measures to restrict the production of raw opium and coca leaves to the medical and scientific needs of the world, and the resultant convention contained merely a provision similar to that in the Hague Convention with the added re-quirement that annual statistics on the production of these raw products be submitted to the Permanent Central Board. The question was raised in the Conference on Manufacture by the Russian delegate, but it was declared to be outside the scope of the conference. It was also briefly considered in the Conference for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in 1936 in connection with the American amendment to Article I of the draft convention before that conference, but was shunted aside. By this time, however, the Opium Advisory Committee and interested governments had behind them several years of serious discussion on this phase of the drug problem, and plans for an international con-ference on the matter were being formulated. The impetus behind this development had come from the international deliberations on the highly perplodng question of opium smoking. Both the Commission of Enquiry to the Far East in 1929-30 and the Bangkok Opium Con-ference had concluded that the opium smoking problem could not be solved until. poppy cultivation was under control. In 1931, as the result of their recommendations, the League apparatus was directed toward preparing for a conference on the matter.
As in other efforts at drug control during the period under study, political and economic considerations were highly involved in the problem of raw material production and trade. This was the reason for the timorousness with which this particular phase of the problem was approached prior to 1930. Rather than deal with the question of supplies at the source, the international conferees attempted to control the supplies themselves with the hope that as a result the source would automatically contract. Specifically, it was hoped that strict limitation of the traffic in and manufacture of narcotic drugs to the quantities necessary to fulfill the world's medical and scientific needs would, by lessening the demand for the raw material from which these drugs were derived, force a reduction in the production of the raw products to the legitimate market demand. In the early 193o's this hope appeared capable of being realized, for the application of the international in-struments of control did produce a substantial drop in the demand for raw opium, with a consequent decline in the prices of the product to one quarter of what they had been in the late 192 o's.'
A new element appeared in the situation which offered further promise of inducing the countries which produced raw opium to come to some agreement, as a measure of self-protection, to curtail produc-tion. This was the development and practical application of a method of extracting opium alkaloids, particularly morphine, directly from the dried poppy plant (poppy straw) without passing through the inter-mediate stage of raw opium.2 The opium poppy was already extensively cultivated in many central, southern, and eastern European countries for its seed, and it could be grown in most warm and temperate climes of the world. Extensive use of poppy straw for the derivation of narcotic drugs could destroy the market for raw opium on which the major producing countries relied for a considerable portion of govern-ment revenue and the economic occupation of their people.
'These factors were not enough, however, to move the producing countries to undertake voluntarily among themselves to restrict culti-vation. What many optimistic persons had failed to consider adequate-ly was the fact that since the poppy was an agricultural product whose cultivation was deeply imbedded in the economic fabric of the producing countries and was an economic habit with many of the cultiva-tors, restriction of its production to market conditions was much harder to achieve than that of industrial products over which firm control could be exercised by the enterprises concerned. It had been amply demonstrated in various countries of the world that contraction of the market for agricultural products was not automatically followed by a reduction of production, but rather, often resulted in a continuing surplus that depressed both prices and the cultivators. In the case of opium, however, there was an outlet, for if the surplus could not be absorbed by the legitimate market, it could be siphoned off into the illicit market, international and national regulations notwithstanding.
The major producers of raw opium during the o's and 193o's were China, India, Turkey, Persia, Yugoslavia, and Russia. Interna-tional concern with production in these countries was concentrated on production for export and only secondarily on the accumulation of surplus quantities of raw products in a country from which the illicit traffic might be supplied. A subsidiary issue was the production of raw opium for eating and for manufacture of prepared opium, both activities being legitimate under the existing international conventions, but unacceptable to such countries as the United States, which insisted on the restriction of the use of all forms of narcotics to strictly medical and scientific purposes. It was estimated that about 90 percent of the world's production of raw opium occurred in China.3 Most of the opium was manufactured into prepared opium, but as both production and consumption in China were illegal until 1934, all of this opium went into the illicit traffic. The other major producer of raw opium in the Far East was India. In 1926 the Indian government announced a policy of gradual cessation of exports of opium for other than medicinal and scientific purposes until such export should cease alto-gether. This action was largely the result of accusations, especially by "impatient idealists" in the United States, that India was perpetuating the abusive use of opium and was feeding the illicit traffic to other territories.4 Russia did not produce raw opium for export. Thus the principal producing-exporting countries were Turkey, Persia, and Yugoslavia. They were the nations whose cooperation was absolutely necessary to an effective movement for limitation of production at the source.
The view that the effective solution of the drug problem could not be achieved until raw material production corresponded with medical and scientific needs had long been the basic American approach to the problem. This view had been expressed at Shanghai in 1909 and had been followed up at the Hague Conferences. After World War I, this principle became the cardinal point in the American program and was referred to in international circles as the American plan. The United States in its earliest association with the League virtually dernanded the acceptance of this principle as part of the price for continued American cooperation with the League on the drug problem. Failing to get little more than verbal support of its position from the inter-national community, the United States temporarily withdrew from meaningful participation in the international movement. It was left up to Americans, working principally in their private capacities, to continue the efforts to put the American plan into effect. In no phase of the drug problem were individual Americans more active interna-tionally than in trying to effect measures to secure limitation at the source.
After the First World War the one American holding no permanent official position with the government who was most active in the international drug-control movement was Mrs. Elizabeth Washburn Wright. Having worked up to the war on the problem with her late husband, Dr. Hamilton Wright, she was intimately acquainted with its various aspects. In 1918 she decided to continue her husband's work.' She came from a family which had been very active in political and international affairs. Her father, William Drew Washburn, had represented Minnesota in both houses of Congress. Four of his brothers also served in that body as members of the House of Representatives, and one of these, Elihu B. Washburn, was Secretary of State for five days in March 1869, after which he served as minister to France until 1877.6
Mrs. Wright was keenly interested in the opium work and made numerous personal sacrifices to carry it on. In her own words she felt herself to be "a tool," "a medium being used by some outside force—for some definite purpose" in regard to the narcotics problem.7 It was she who took the lead in calling the attention of the American govern-ment to the recrudescence of poppy cultivation in China after 1917. Like others, she realized that the peace negotiations following the World War would offer an ideal opportunity to secure broad ad-herence to the Hague Convention.' She therefore went to Paris during the Peace Conference to lend her voice to those supporting the idea of providing for such adherence through the peace treaties. She also attended the two Lausanne Conferences concerning Turkey for the same purpose. In 192o she went again to the Far East to observe con-ditions there.' While in Paris during the peace negotiations, she urged American officials to take the initiative in the postwar international action on the drug problem." Thereafter, she constantly sought some official position with the American government" so that she might have an influential platform from which to carry on her work. She was unsuccessful in securing a permanent position, however, despite the recommendations from time to time of such influential persons as Bishop Brent, Stephen G. Porter, and Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover.12 She did serve on the American delegation to the Second Geneva Opium Conference in r 94-1925, being thus the first American woman to receive plenipotentiary powers as a diplomat. She was also employed by the Bureau of Narcotics in r 93o to survey the Philippine opium situation, and she remained with the Bureau to help secure the enactment by the states of a uniform narcotic law. Most of her work, however, was carried on without any official connection with the American government.
Mrs. Wright continually urged the United States to appoint a per-manent representative to the Opium Advisory Committee,13 a position which she would have liked to have held herself. As an assessor on the committee from 1921 to 1925, she kept the State Department fully informed on the activities of the committee and bombarded the De-partment with her views and suggestions. Before the government did appoint a representative to the committee, the State Department had in her a useful source from which to obtain the most intimate details of the committee's attitude and work. As indicated by the sitnilarity of their reports, Mrs. Wright greatly influenced the views of the first American representative to the committee, Rupert Blue, as to the policy which the United States should adopt toward that organ." In fact, by her energy, zeal, and uncompromising dedication, she undoubt-edly contributed in great measure to the formation of American drug policy in the 192,o's. She was regarded by American officials as perhaps the most knowledgeable of the Americans working in the movement.15 Her idealism, however, irritated many foreigners, par-ticularly the representatives of countries which had financial interest in the traffic in prepared opium, and her presence on the Advisory Com-mittee, which initially consisted primarily of the representatives of the so-called "opium bloc" countries, was often a source of discomfort to the committee.16
The great emphasis which the United States placed on the theme of limitation of production, after World War I, was to a considerable degree the result of the persuasion and activides of Mrs. Wright. She had early concluded that restriction at the source was the only way to deal with the opium question." In pursuit of this goal and with the blessings of the State Department, she visited Turkey and Persia in 1923 on her own initiative to investigate poppy-growing conditions with a view to discovering a practicable basis on which the countries might be persuaded to curtail cultivation." Largely through her survey the United States gained a fuller understanding of the problems which beset the opium-producing countries.
The variety of uses to which the products from the opium poppy plant could be put was clearly demonstrated in Turkey. The growth of the poppy for oil was the major concern. The oil was extracted from the poppy seed and used domestically in soap and varnish, for lamps, and as a food oil. Some of the surplus seed not used domestically was exported for preparation and use as salad oil, as oil cake for cattle, for adulterating olive oil, and for artists' paints. The growth of the poppy for opium was, however, an extensive and profitable enterprise, but required much greater care in cultivation than poppy growth for oil. Its cultivation was essentially an economic issue, for opium smoking was not a common habit among the inhabitants of Turkey. Since the opium trade was primarily in the hands of Jews and Armenians, there was no great national attachment to the opium industry." The principal markets-for the Turkish product were Europe and the United States. Most of the American imports of raw opium came from Turkey. Be-cause of its high morphine content, it was most sought after for the manufacture of derivatives. Although in 1928 control over imports and domestic drug transactions was established, exports of raw opium remained unsupervised." It was not until 1932, as a result of American pressure, that Turkey finally agreed to ratify the Hague and Geneva Conventions.21
The American consul general at Constantinople, G. Bie Ravndal, convinced Mrs. Wright in 192 3 that if a proper substitute crop could be found Turkey could be persuaded to reduce poppy cultivation. Such possible substitutes might be grain, cotton, tobacco, and silk. Certain American cigarette manufacturers had already helped to rehabilitate tobacco culture in Turkey by sending experts to that country to su-pervise the tobacco industry and help finance and direct the activities of growers. The consul general urged the broadening and continuation of activities such as these. He particularly urged that Americans help to reestablish sericulture and the silk industry in Turkey by setting up a school of sericulture, an agricultural bank to extend rural credits to farmers to grow mulberry plants, and a reeling factory.22 On her return to America Mrs. Wright sought to give effect to Ravndal's suggestions by urging silk manufacturers and American bankers to help develop silk cultivation in both Turkey and Persia.23 Her efforts were apparently of no avail.
Aside from China, opium production in Persia presented the most difficult problem from the international standpoint. The Persian opium situation is also most illustrative of the part played by AmeriCans not officially connected with the American government in working for a solution to this particular aspect of the drug question. Persia's record in the field of international cooperation on the drug problem, like Turkey's, was not good. Although represented at the Shanghai Com-mission and the first Hague Opium Conference, the Persian govern-ment had refused to ratify the Hague Convention. At both meetings the Persian delegate had rejected the principle that countries should prevent at their ports of departure the shipment of the various forms of opium to countries which prohibited their entry. Thus, in signing the Hague Convention, he made a reservation to Article 3 (a) in which this obligation was embodied. The reason behind the refusal to accept this principle was the desire not to interfere with the lucrative trade in Persian opium to China, which became even more extensive with the cessation of Indian exports to China. In keeping with this policy, Persia also refused to accept the import and export certificate system. Down to 192 8 the only control which the Persian government exer-cised over opium exports was that necessary for the collection of export duties and other fees.24 Even after this date, when certain limited measures were put into effect, Persian opium continued to feed the illicit traffic in the Far East and accounted for the bulk of the raw opium found in the illicit traffic in the United States even after the out-break of World War II.25
In addition to Mrs. Wright, other Americans became intimately involved in the situation in Persia. The American Financial Mission to Persia from 1922 to 192, 7, headed by Dr. Arthur C. Millspaugh, a former economic adviser to the State Department, bore the greatest responsibility. In carrying out its assignment of reorganizing the Per-sian finances, the American Mission was given the task of collecting the opium revenues, which in turn required the enforcement of the Persian government's regulations for the control of the domestic traffic. At the same time the mission looked forward to the restriction of opium production and the eventual elimination of the rather widespread drug habit.26 Following the statement of the American position on raw opiumyroduction in the Advisory Committee in May 192 3, the Ameri-can Mission proceeded to acquaint the State Department with condi-tions in Persia in regard to opium and the possible policy which Persia might be able to follow.27 As administrator-general of the Persian finances, Millspaugh helped to formulate Persia's opium policy, and although the American Mission had no official connection with the American government, Millspaugh's views were given respectful at-tention by the State Department.
In Millspaugh's view, economic and political conditions in Persia in the 192o's made absolutely impossible any immediate drastic mea-sures to restrict opium production and to curtail the traffic in the commodity. The opium poppy was cultivated in eighteen of the twenty-six provinces, and in many of these provinces it was the only cash crop of any significance. Exclusive of oil, opium constituted from z o to 25 percent of Persia's total export trade. It accounted for about 9 percent of the government's revenue. The wealthiest class in Persia and many of the most influential clergy were opium producers and merchants. The use of the drug in the form of smoking opium was widespread. Any sudden drastic restriction on the trade in and produc-tion of the drug would wreak havoc on an already depressed economy. It would result in an increase in the existing large deficit in the govern-ment's treasury, enlarge the already serious adverse balance of trade, worsen the extensive unemployment and poverty, and leave a con-siderable amount of capital idle. Such a step would most likely create political disturbances in a country where political instability was al-ready rife and the control of the central government over certain areas tenuous. In short, efforts at sudden and drastic curtailment of opium activities in Persia were not likely to be effective, and the evils flowing from such attempts would far outweigh any progress made.28
Millspaugh compared the difficulty of the opium problem in Persia with the complexity of the liquor problem in the United States. He pointed out that prohibition was put into effect in the United States only after decades of discussion and trial on the state and local level, and that still it was not effective. He oppugned American impatience with Persia's refusal to ratify and put into effect the Hague Convention with the observation that, "if the United States had signed a liquor agreement, similar to the International Opium Agreement, it is very doubtful whether an impartial observer would say that the United States is at the present time fulfilling the obligation stipulated by that Agreement."29
Although the American Mission defended the hesitancy of the Persian government to take the precipitate action which the Opium Advisory Committee of the League and the United States were urging it to take, they were clearly committed to the view that Persia should begin immediately to plan measures for the gradual restriction of opium production, consumption, and trade. By pointing out to the Persian government the possible political consequences that might accrue if Persia continued to decline to ratify the Hague Convention, Millspaugh was able to get the government to promise conditional acceptance of the instrument. Continued recalcitrance in this matter, he warned, would lead to hostility and censure and the "moral isolation" of Persia from other governments and people, which in turn would have a dis-astrous effect upon Persia's quest for foreign capita1.3° Persia's League representative was thus carrying out Millspaugh's suggestions when he informed the Fifth Committee of the Assembly in September 1923 that his government would begin immediately to take steps look-ing to the gradual restriction of the production and consumption of opium to medical and scientific purposes, and that Persia was prepared to withdraw its reservation to Article 3 (a) of the Hague Convention upon the condition that the other signatory powers and the League of Nations would agree to allow Persia a reasonable period of time in which to institute a program of crop substitutions for opium cultivation and to put other measures into effect.31
Persia's position at the Geneva Opium Conference was also formu-lated by the American Mission, and the memorandum submitted to the conference by the Persian delegate was the work of Colonel D. W. MacCormack, the Director of Internal Revenue. In inducing the Persian government to indorse the memorandum, MacCormack warned that in addition to the probable moral isolation of Persia and its con-sequent effect upon securing foreign loans, failure of the Persian delegate to indicate to the conference some progress toward carrying out the Hague Convention and the American principles might cause the parties to that convention which had accepted the import and export certificate system to boycott Persian opium. In addition, other countries might follow the British in refusing to allow their ships to transport the Persian commodity.32
To forestall unfavorable reaction to Persia at the conference, the Council of Ministers approved MacCormack's memorandum with only minor changes.33 Thus the Persian delegate was instructed to assure the conferees that Persia was in "full accord and sympathy" with the League's efforts to suppress the illicit traffic, and that it accepted the American principles of interpretation of the Hague Convention and was prepared to withdraw conditionally its reservation to Article 3 (a) of that instrument. He was instructed to give unconditional assurances that Persia would continue to extend the measures already taken to control domestic traffic and consumption and to prevent smuggling. Moreover the government would take steps to bring cultivation under control, to prohibit the importation of opium for reexport to countries prohibiting its entry from the country of origin, to keep records of opium consumption, cultivation, and export, and to encourage the planting of mulberry trees, cotton, and tobacco as substitute crops for the opium poppy. To give full effect to the American fir` inciples, however, Persia would need a long period of preparation in which a program of crop substitution and the development of the mineral resources of Persia, requiring a large capital investment and adequate technical advice and direction, could be instituted. To finance such a project Persia would need a load of o,000,000 tomans to be paid back within a period of twenty years at not more than 5 percent interest per year and with no interest charges for the first five years, a mora-torium on foreign claims against Persia, and the removal of foreign restrictions on Persia's tariff policy. If such a program could be put into effect, then Persia would reduce opium cultivation by one-tenth an-nually until production coincided with the quantities needed for medical and scientific purposes, and production in a number of prov-inces would be eliminated entirely within three years. When cultiva-tion had been reduced to medical and scientific requirements, then Persia would fully accept the system of import certificates.34
As a result of the work of Mrs. Wright and the formulation of Per-sian policy by the American Financial Mission, the United States was inclined to adopt a sympathetic attitude toward Persia's problem. At the Geneva Conference the American delegation gave general support to the Persian stipulations.38 Mrs. Wright had already sought to influence the League in Persia's behalf when at the fifth and sixth sessions of the Advisory Committee in 192 3 and 1924, respectively, she had re-ported on the situation in Persia and had suggested that the League look into the matter of crop substitutes for opium cultivation.38 It will be recalled that it was she who had proposed the resolution on behalf of the American delegation at the Geneva Conference calling for the sending of a commission of inquiry to the producing countries to study their problems relating to the production of and traffic in opium with the view to the feasibility of substituting other crops.37 This recommendation was incorporated in the Final Act of the conference.
In May and June 192.5 Mrs. Wright obtained assurances from Tur-key and Persia that they would welcome a commission of inquiry to study the opium situation in their territory, although Turkey pro-fessed a preference for a strictly American commission rather than one sponsored by the League. In September i925 the Assembly of the League, in accordance with the recommendation in the Final Act of the Geneva Opium Conference, adopted a resolution of the Fifth Committee providing for the sending of a commission to Persia to study the situation there in regard to the cultivation of the opium poppy and the possible replacement of a portion of this cultivation by other crops. It recommended that oo,000 gold francs be provided to finance the commission. The commission was to consist of three persons appointed by the League Council: a person to act as president, an expert on agriculture, and someone with experience in the business and markets of the East and with a knowledge of transportation prob-lems.38 Since the proposal had originated with the American delegation at the Geneva Opium Conference, the League was quite willing to accept an American to head the commission. But the State Department, despite its hearty approval of the project, refused to exercise any initiative in the matter. Seeking to avoid contamination by the League after the Opium Conference debacle, the State Department refrained from associating in any manner with the commission. It refused to give formal assurances of its approval of the investigation and barred any official of the government from serving on the commission. It limited its support to offering to give whatever informal assistance it could to the American finally chosen to head the commission." Thus the burden of influencing the composition of the commission and of giving it open support was placed upon private citizens.
Even before the League had decided to send the commission to Persia, Mrs. Wright, feeling that the proposal would be rejected by the League, had secured a pledge from the Bureau of Social Hygiene that it would underwrite the project financially." When the Sixth Assem-bly reduced the suggested 200,000 franc appropriation called for by the resolution of the Fifth Committee to ioo,000 francs, Mrs. Wright and Mrs. Helen H. Moorhead persuaded the foundation to supply the extra roo,000 francs to bring the sum up to that originally suggested." It was also Mrs. Wright who, after approaching some seven or eight persons, including such prominent Americans as Owen D. Young and Norman Davis, finally secured the services of Frederic A. Delano, a former member of the Federal Reserve Board, to head the commission." The other members of the Commission of Enquiry to Persia were an Italian, Dr. Fridiano Cavaro, professor of botany at the University of Naples, and a Frenchman, Victor Cayla, an agricultural engineer. As his own personal staff, Delano chose J. B. Knight, an agricultural expert with experience in India and America, and Archi-bald MacLeish as his private secretary. The League furnished a secre-tary and stenographer for the commission."43
From March 24 to June 6, 1926, the commission traveled through-out Persia and compiled a study of Persia's physical geography, her economic and commercial history, existing conditions as to climate, water resources, agriculture, transport, commerce, labor, industries, land tenure, and taxation, and the current situation in regard to poppy cultivation and the feasibility of establishing substitute crops and in-dustries." It concluded that the institution of a program of curtailing opium production and of introducing substitute crops and other enter-prises was not only practicable but would be economically beneficial to Persia and would not place any undue strain on Persia's economy." Opium production could be replaced by the revival of various indus-tries which were dying out, such as silk, wood, and cotton fabrics, pottery, tiles, earthenware, and bricks, artistic metal work, wood carving, and inlaying, painting miniatures, decorating, and engrossing parchment, sheep, lamb, and goat skins, hides, and leather goods. In addition, new industries such as those dependent on mineral oil, the preparation of vegetable oils from such products as rape seed, peanut oil, castor oil, and soya beans, the making and distribution of dried fruits, preserves, and similar products, the preparation of maple sugar cane, and gypsum, lime, and cement manufacture might be developed. Crops to supply the raw material for many of these industries might replace opium cultivation."46
The commission recommended that before inaugurating this ad-venturesome program Persia should be allowed a three-year prepara-tory period during which the government would institute an effective system of control over opium production and undertake experimental steps in crop substitution. During the same period, Persia would at-tempt to improve its internal economic conditions, inaugurate exten-sive improvements in transportation facilities, water resources, and agricultural methods, build up its sources of revenue, and adjust its import tariff system so as to encourage and protect home industries. After this three-year period of preparation, the government should then begin a program of gradually reducing the acreage devoted to poppy cultivation by o percent annually." It should be noted that the commission failed to recommend the loan to Persia, which Persia had earlier suggested, to finance the project of poppy curtailment. This omission was due to the Persian government's subsequent decision not to seek a loan "of any kind, for any purpose."48 Both Delano and Millspaugh agreed that the proposal for a loan had been unwise, and the Persian government officially withdrew the request."49
The Persian government approved the general tenor of the com-mission's report and recommendations, but took vigorous exception to some of the features of the report. It criticized the commission for failing to take into consideration the legitimate demands for Persian opium. This was an important point, for as Persia had not accepted Article 3 (a) of the Hague Convention nor the import and export certificate system, it did not regard the shipments of opium to the Far East uncovered by this system as illicit traffic. Another major criticism of the commission's report was the failure to suggest a corresponding limitation of production in other producing countries." While ap-proving the commission's recommendation of a 1 o percent annual reduction in the area under poppy cultivation after a three-year preparatory period, the Persian government insisted that such a reduction should be carried on experimentally for three years to gauge its effects, and if the results were favorable, the reduction would then continue." The Persian government also agreed to accept in part the import and export certificate system to be accompanied within at least three years by an annual reduction of 1 o percent of the quantity of opium al-lowed to leave the country uncovered by such certificates and to study the feasibility of increasing the export duties on such opium."52
These observations of the Persian government were drawn up by Colonel MacCormack, who appeared personally before the League Council in March 1927 and before the Fifth Committee of the Assem-bly in September as a representative of the Persian government. The Council took no action on the commission's report or the Persian ob-servations, but referred the matter to the Assembly. On September 20, 1927, the League Assembly adopted a resolution proposed by its Fifth Committee expressing its thanks to the Commission of Enquiry and requesting, at MacCormack's suggestion, the governments con-cerned to cooperate with Persia in removing restrictive tariffs on the Persian products which were to be substituted for opium and in grant-ing Persia autonomy in regard to its own tariffs. Persia was requested to keep the League informed on the progress made in carrying out her suggested program, and other producing and manufacturing countries were urged to take similar steps to effect the necessary reduction of raw materials and manufactured drugs. The Advisory Committee later expressed disappointment at Persia's refusal to accept the entire pro-gram suggested by the commission, but recognized that the steps which Persia proposed to take constituted a marked advance.53
The American Financial Mission left Persia in 1927. It was thus unable to influence the enactment of the opium control program which it had laid out for the Persian government. Nevertheless, the govern-ment did take certain preliminary steps when in July 1928 it enacted legislation establishing a government monopoly over circulation, stor-age, and the domestic and international sale of opium. It also prohibited the importation of the drug except upon special license and instituted a program for the gradual reduction of consumption until it would be completely suppressed within ten years. It was hoped that these measures would increase revenue, suppress smuggling, and satisfy world opinion that Persia was trying to meet its international obliga-tions." However, these measures did not materially affect the situation with reference to the escape of Persian opium into the illicit traffic, and the failure to carry out the rest of the recommended program left opium production at a high level. The Persian opium situation there-fore remained a matter for serious concern well beyond the 193o's.
The disinclination of the League after 1927 to pursue further the subject of limitation of raw materials and the American policy of avoiding collaboration with the League precluded any further progress in the 192, o's toward control of poppy cultivation and raw opium production. Mrs. Wright continued her efforts in this regard, however. She sought support for investigation of raw material production in other producing countries similar to that which had been conducted in Persia.55 As Turkey was not receptive to the idea of a League commission, Mrs. Wright tried to get the American government to send a strictly American commission to that country."56 She and Congress-man Porter attempted to persuade Henry Ford to finance such a project inasmuch as the Rockefeller Foundation had backed the Commission of Enquiry to Persia; but Ford failed to respond." Therefore, in re-sponse to the specific suggestion ofAdmiral Mark Bristol, the American High Commissioner in Turkey, she went again to Turkey in 1927 to conduct a preliminary survey of the opium situation there. Turkish officials expressed a willingness to endorse formally the American position on the necessity of restricting raw material production and to conduct an investigation of their own into the opium situation in Turkey if the United States would officially request a statement of Turkey's attitude on the subject. But as no such request was forth-coming from the American government, the statement drafted by Mrs. Wright expressing the attitude of the Turkish government was not endorsed by that government."58
Despite lack of encouragement from the State Department, Mrs. Wright continued her work to achieve the goal of limitation at the source. She consistently pressed the American government to begin pre-liminary work toward the convening by the United States of a confer-ence of the opium and coca leaf producing countries and thus resume leadership in the international movement." But the State Department, detecting no change in the attitudes expressed by the producin,g coun-tries at the Geneva Conference, saw no merit in her proposal. The Department was undecided whether to continue to place major emphasis on the curtailment of production of raw material or to shift its attention to a goal more likely to be achieved, the limitation of manufacture. Having no concrete and practical proposals to offer as a basis for hold-ing a conference of producing states beyond the principles enunciated in 1924-192 5, the State Department believed that such a conference would be futile." Therefore, the American government temporarily relegated the question of limitation at the source to the background and concentrated its attention and efforts on achieving limitation of manufacture. As discussed in Chapter IX, these efforts culminated in the Narcotics Limitation Convention of 193i .
When the United States again took up the issue of restriction of production, it had renewed its collaboration with the League. The revival of the subject was initiated by the League. On September 6, 193i, the Fifth Committee of the Assembly adopted the following resolution:
Taking note of the wish of certain Governments that a conference should meet in the near future to consider the possibility of limiting and controlling the cultivation of the opium-poppy and the cultivation and harvesting of the coca-leaf; and,
Taking note also of the decision reached by the Council at its sixty-second session, in January 1931, to ask the Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs to consider the possibility of summoning a conference of the Governments concerned and to report to the Council on the subject:
Asks the Advisory Committee . . . and the competent sections of the Secretariat of the League of Nations to undertake, as soon as possible, the collection of all material that may serve as a basis for the discussions of a Conference on the Limitation of the Production of Opium and the cultiva-tion and harvesting of the coca-leaf, and for that purpose to send a ques-tionnaire to the Governments Members and non-members of the League.61
This resolution, which was subsequently adopted by the full Assembly, was based on a recommendation of the Commission of Enquiry to the Far East. It was originally presented by the representative of Panama at the instigation of A. E. Blanco, and was supported by the Italian, Spanish, and British representatives. While giving general endorsement to the resolution, the producing countries took care to call attention to the economic aspects of the subject which would complicate the achievement of the goal desired.62 The resolution was the logical out-come of the preceding deliberations on the narcotics problem which had just culminated in the convention limiting the manufacture of narcotic drugs.
Because of the nature of this phase of the narcotics problem, exten-sive preparations for a conference were necessary. From i932 to 1937 the Advisory Committee devoted its activities on the matter primarily to collecting information on all aspects of raw material production, traffic, and use and the bearing these operations had on the social, agricultural, commercial, economic, and financial conditions in the producing countries.° In 1936 it recommended the separation of the problem of opium cultivation from that of the cultivation and harvest-ing of the coca leaf. This was necessary because the two problems dif-fered considerably from each other in their economic and social aspects. While progress was being made in regard to the opium problem, the coca leaf producing countries were not yet prepared to cooperate. After 1936, then, the Advisory Committee, while continuing to collect and study data on both problems, concentrated on preparing for a conference on raw opium production and postponed to a later date consideration of the curtailment of coca leaf cultivation.64
The United States fully approved of these preparations by the League, and it cooperated fully where possible. While desiring that a conference be held as soon as practicable, the American government continued to resist pressure for its own initiation of such a conference. Despite the absence of poppy cultivation in the United States, the government did not feel justified in taking the initiative on this matter, for it had passed no effective legislation to control such cultivation. Constitutional difficulties stood in the way of such action, for under the federal system this subject was deemed to be exclusively within the domain of the states. An attempt to get state action on the matter had been made by the Porter Act of 193o, which authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to cooperate with the states to secure such legislation. The Uniform Narcotic Drug Act had been endorsed in 1932, and the Treasury Department sent Mrs. Wright and Mrs. Isabel O'Neil to officials of the various states to urge the enactment of the Act. Prior to the passage of the Act by Nevada in March 1933, no state prohibited or controlled in any way the growth of the opium poppy or the production of raw opium. By the fall of 1934 only eight states had passed the Act."
Another view presented in the State Department was that govern-ments deriving considerable revenue from the traffic in raw opium should refrain from assuming a leadership role in convening a con-ference. The American government might fall in this category in that it derived nearly a million dollars annually from such impositions as import duties, excise taxes, license fees, and fees for drug order forms." This argument obviously carried little weight, for most governments which strictly regulated the raw opium traffic received revenue which was incidental to the system of control.
A weightier consideration was the State Department's opinion that the summoning of an early conference would be a waste of time. In such major producing countries as Turkey, Yugoslavia, and India, from which effective limitation might be expected, production was not much in excess of legitimate needs. In the problem countries such as China and Persia, however, there was little disposition, because of either the inability or unwillingness of the governments, to restrict cultivation. Furthermore, time was needed to study adequately the situation raised by the recently effected method of extracting morphine from poppy straw. The United States therefore preferred to work within the framework of the League, where presumably the necessary groundwork for a conference was being laid with thorough study and preparation.67 In the meantime, however, the State Department in-stituted negotiations with Canada and Mexico with a view to con-cluding a trilateral treaty prohibiting the cultivation of the opium poppy and the production of raw opium in the three countries. Discussions on the subject began in 1936, and by the end of i939 negotia-tions were well under way." The treaty was never consummated, however.
The United States did not acquiesce in all the suggestions emanating from the League. The State Department took vigorous exception to a resolution adopted by the Assembly which called for the holding of two preliminary conferences, one consisting of countries producing raw opium and exporting it to manufacturing countries together with the manufacturing countries; the other consisting of producing coun-tries which exported raw opium to countries which had established smoking opium monopolies together with these monopoly countries. This resolution revived the old controversy as to what should be regarded as production for legitimate purposes. The United States had consistently maintained that only production for strictly medical and scientific purposes was legitimate, while the opium monopoly coun-tries contended that under the Hague Convention and subsequently the Geneva Agreement, production for opium eating as practiced in India and for the manufacture of prepared opium was legitimate.
On the resolution proper, the United States took the position that the idea contemplated in it of restricting a conference on the limitation of production to producing and manufacturing countries was unwise. Since the opium poppy could be grown in most parts of the world and from it opiates could be derived without going through the intermedi-ate stage of raw opium, surplus supplies of such products anywhere in the world would find their way into the illicit traffic. Therefore, a con-ference on limitation should be open to all governments. Furthermore, separate preliminary conferences were neither necessary nor desirable. Regardless of the purpose for which raw opium was produced—for medical derivatives or for smoking opium—an excess would go into the illicit traffic. The American government still adhered to the principle that the production of raw opium was a single question; production should be limited to medical and scientific requirements, any other use being an abuse. If provisions for supplying opium smoking monopolies with raw opium were "absolutely necessary temporarily" the United States contended that such measures should provide for a reduction by a definite percentage annually of the amount of raw opium to be made available for such purposes. Thus the United States was pre-pared to refuse to participate in any preliminary conference or in a later general conference unless it was clearly established in advance that the limitation of poppy cultivation for morphine extraction and of raw opium production for all purposes, including the manufacture, internal trade in, and use of prepared opium were to be considered.°69
The Canadian representative had expressed views at the twenty-first session of the Advisory Committee similar to those of the United States on the necessity of suppressing raw opium production for all purposes, but Canada had not opposed the suggestions for holding preliminary conferences when the subject was discussed in the Fifth Committee of the Assembly. The United States therefore sought to get Canada's support in opposing in the next session of the Advisory Committee the plans for holding the preliminary conferences, and through Canada, to convince the British government of the inadvis-ability of such preliminary discussions.7° Through conversations with the Canadian government this support was obtained. The Canadian government informed the British government of the American and Canadian views, thus obviating any American approach to Great Britain." At the twenty-third session of the Advisory Committee, the American and Canadian representatives, as previously agreed, voiced their objections to the holding of the preliminary confer-ences. As a result of their protests, this idea was abandoned in favor of the British suggestion that the Advisory Committee resolve itself into a special preparatory committee to make a preliminary examina-tion of the material on the problem." At this session the Advisory Committee, sitting as a preparatory committee, drew up a set of prin-ciples on which a future raw opium limitation convention should be based." At its session in 1929 a draft convention based on these principles was drawn up. Both the list of principles and the draft con-vention were presented to the interested governments for their views.
The system of limitation provided for in the draft convention was based on that of the Narcotics Limitation Convention covering manu-factuied drugs. Significant differences had to be provided for, how-ever, since the control of the production of an agricultural product involved many variables. These included fluctuating yield brought on by weather and soil, the inability to adjust production rapidly to changes in demand, and for opium, the difference in the morphine content and consistence (percentage of anhydrous opium contained in a given quantity of raw opium) of raw opium produced under dif-ferent climatic and soil conditions and in different areas of the world. The draft convention and the principles underlying it covered five general topics: the purpose of poppy cultivation and raw opium pro-duction, methods of achieving limitation and at the same time providing for a constant supply, the allocation of production among the produc-ing countries, internal control of cultivation and production, and the application of international controls.74
Poppy cultivation and raw opium production were to be confined to recognized world requirements of opium and opiates for medical and scientific needs, for the manufacture temporarily of prepared opium, subject to any limitations which might be provided for in the convention, and for other forms of nonmedical consumption (opium eating) currently authorized in certain countries. Limitation of pro-duction to such purposes was to be achieved through the estimate system. All countries would submit to an international controlling authority esdmates of needs, and if such estimates were validated, the contracting parties would be required to purchase or import the full quantity, but no more, of their estimates. This obligation was neces-sary to protect producing countries, which were required to produce and export the quantities necessary to fill the estimates, from fluctua-tions in demand. The purchase of drugs for re-export were also to be included in the estimates. The producing countries had also to sub-mit, annually, binding estimates of production on the basis of the area to be cultivated. To insure that estimates of needs would be filled despite variations in output and to meet emergency demands, regulat-ing stocks were to be maintained by producing countries. Consuming countries might maintain stocks for the use of the military and for emergency situations."75
A major problem was how to allocate production and exports among the producing countries. The draft envisaged a choice between a quota system and a free order system." Under the quota system each pro-ducing country would be allotted on the basis of the estimates of needs a certain percentage of the total world production for export. This would guarantee the producing countries a market and contribute to the stablization of both markets and prices. The disadvantage in the quota system lay in the creation of a monopoly for the existing pro-ducing countries and in depriving the purchasing countries of freedom of choice in selecting their source of supply. To remedy this latter defect, as well as to guarantee to some extent a stable market for the producing countries, the quota system, as provided for in the draft convention, required the consuming countries to state in their esti-mates, in order of preference, the country or countries from which they would obtain supplies. Under the free order system each pro-ducing country would produce for export the amount the consuming countries had stated in their estimates that they intended to purchase from that particular producing country. Thus freedom of choice in selecting their source of supply would be allowed to purchasing countries, and competition for markets would be maintained among the producing-exporting countries. The disadvantage in this system lay in the probable lack of stability in raw opium production, for if large purchasing countries changed their sources of supply from year to year, the producing countries affected would be placed in the al-most impossible situation of trying to keep agricultural production abreast of the rise and fall in demand.
To control domestic cultivation and production the draft conven-tion provided for a government monopoly in the producing countries of all activities and transactions in opium, from cultivation to distribu-tion. Aside from the activities of the controlling authorities with refer-ence to the estimates, international supervision of the trade in raw opium was to be maintained through the application of the import and export certificate system."77
The draft convention did not deal with the important matter of poppy straw, for by 1939 no consensus had been reached among the countries producing raw opium and those using or contemplating using the poppy straw method of extracting opiates. The raw opium producers wanted to prohibit entirely the extraction of opium alkaloids from poppy straw in order to protect their declining market for raw opium for the manufacture of derivatives. The countries using the extraction method naturally opposed restrictions on their authority to use domestically produced products to meet their own needs, and they were reluctant to give up their right to export. A possible solution to the controversy was to confine the use of poppy straw for the extrac-tion of opium alkaloids to the domestic needs of countries already en-gaged in such activities. The whole question, however, was left for future consideration by the Advisory Committee or by the proposed conference."78
Agreement had not been reached by 1939 on two other important matters necessary for effective limitation of raw material production. An international system of control providing for a stable market and a stable but limited source of supply would also have to provide for some degree of price stability in order to protect both producers and consumers. Producers needed to be assured that they would receive reasonable prices for their products, especially since curtailment of production might entail a considerable economic sacrifice for them. Consumers likewise needed assurance that the limited supplies avail-able to them could be obtained at equitable prices. In addition, price regulation was desirable, since opium transactions under the estimate system entailed dealing in futures, as orders for raw opium would have to be placed considerably in advance of delivery. Of equal importance was the need for a uniform standard on which to formulate and submit statistics of production and trade, for the morphine content and con-sistence of raw opium varied considerably according to locality and conditions under which the opium poppy was cultivated. The settle-ment of these two issues was also left to future discussions."79
In general the views of the United States corresponded with the prin-ciples and provisions of the draft convention. As usual, the United States was particularly insistent that any limitation scheme devised clearly provide for the early limitation of the production of both raw opium and the cultivation of the poppy plant for the extraction of opium alkaloids to strictly medical and scientific requirements. There-fore the government suggested that provision be made to reduce by a fixed percentage annually the amount of raw opium produced for transformation into prepared opium. The draft convention did not deal with this matter, but left it for future consideration. As a result of its controversy with the League Secretary General over the issue of the budgetary independence of the Permanent Central Board and the Supervisory Body, the American government was equally insistent that any control machinery given functions by the raw material con-vention be absolutely and completely independent, and that provision be made for the parties to the convention to pay an equitable share of the cost of its implementation. This subject, too, was not covered by the draft convention, for the drafters had not progressed to the point of stipulating detailed measures of how it should be implemented.
The United States indicated no particular preference as to whether the quota or free order system should be adopted. What it desired was a system that would provide a constant and equitable division of the legitimate market without discriminating against the consuming coun-tries. Thus the consuming countries should be allowed to become producing countries, especially for their internal needs, in the event they were discriminated against in the matter of supply or in case the existing source of supply was diminished or cut off' by an emer-gency. Furthermore, producing and consuming countries party to the convention should not engage in any transactions with countries not party to the convention.
Finally, the United States appealed for the incorporation of measures in the convention providing for a "complete and absolute" system of government control over the cultivation of the opium poppy, the distribttion of its products, and the maintenance of stocks of these products.8° The United States did not draw up a draft convention of its own, but limited its activity to informing the Advisory Committee of the general principles on which an acceptable convention should be based. It was undoubtedly gratified to see that in the draft convention of the Advisory Committee a real advance toward the American goal of limitation at the source was being made.
As in other matters, the outbreak of World War II interrupted prog-ress toward the conclusion of an agreement on what was regarded as the basic step toward solution of the narcotics problem. The Advisory Committee, consisting as it did of representatives of governments, was unable to continue functioning. The United States therefore sought to keep the issue alive. In June 1944 Congress passed a reso-lution introduced by Representative Walter Judd, a former missionary to China, requesting the President to urge the opium-producing coun-tries to take steps to limit production to strictly medical and scientific needs. In accordance with the resolution, notes were subsequently sent late in the same year to Afghanistan, Great Britain (for India and Burma), China, Iran, Mexico, the Soviet Union, Turkey, and Yugo-slavia. Satisfactory replies were received from Afghanistan, which stated that it had prohibited all cultivation of the opium poppy as of March 21, 1945, and Turkey, which declared that it was fully prepared to continue its program of limiting production and would participate in any conference called for that purpose. Great Britain, in replying for India, reiterated its long-held position that it would control production and export, but as opium was used for quasi-medical purposes, it could not wholly meet the American request. No reply was received from Iran.81 The United Nations took over the issue in 1945. In June 1953 an international agreement for the limitation of the production of opium at the source was concluded in a United Nations conference in New York.82 Thus after thirty years, through the instrumentality of the United Nations, the principle which the United States had enun-ciated in its first association with the League of Nations on the drug problem finally won the acceptance of the international community.
1. Renborg, International Drug Control, p. 158.
2. /bid., pp. x58, x7o-171.
3.See above, p. 282.
4. League of Nations, Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Danger-ous Drugs, Provisional Minutes of the Eighth Session Held at Geneva from May 26th to June 8th, tp26, C.393.M.136.15a6.XI (Geneva, 192.6), pp. 36-37. See also Council of State Debates, Monday and Tuesday, 8th and 9th February, t926, VII, No. (Delhi: Government of India Press, 1926), enclosed in Consul General Julius G. Lay (Calcutta) to the Secretary of State, April 22, 1926, SDR 511.4Azigoo.
5. Memorandum by William McNeer to E. T. Williams, June 5, 1918, SDR 511.4Ai/1525.
6. The New York Times, Feb. 14, 1952, p. 27, contains Mrs. Wright's obituary. For the activities of her father and uncles see DAB, XIX, 495-496, 5°2-506.
7. Mrs. Wright to William Philips, July 24, 1922, SDR 51 r .4A r r 66o.
8. Memorandum by McNeer to Williams, June 5, 1918, SDR 511.4A r/1525.
9. Constance Drexel, "Are We Our Brothers' Keepers? How Our Country is Fight-ing the Drug Evil," Harper's Magazine, CXLIX (Nov., 1924), 74o.
10. James Brown Scott to Lester H. Wooley, Feb. 25, 192o, SDR 511.4AT/1555.
11. See, for example, Mrs. Wright to Scott, Jan. 29, r92o, enclosed in Mrs. Wright to William Phillips, July 24, 922, SDR 511.4A1/166o.
12. Porter to the Secretary of State, Dec. 28, 1923, SDR r 1.4Ar/r 875. Hoover to the Secretary of State, June 9, 1921, SDR 511.4AI/1681.
13 Ibid. See also, memorandum by Undersecretary of State Joseph C. Grew of conversation with Mrs. Wright, Jan. 15, 1926, SDR 511.4A2/4.7o.
14. See above, p. 157.
15. Hoover to the Secretary of State, June 9, 1921, SDR r 1.4A r/r68i ; Secretary of State Hughes to the American Legation (Berne), April 4, 1923, SDR 51E4AI/1753.
16. Minister Joseph C. Grew (Berne) to the Secretary of State, April 12, 1923, SDR 5Ir.4Ar/1753; Consul Tuck (Geneva) to the Secretary of State, July 1, 1925, SDR 511.4Pu/367.
17. Memorandum by W. R. Castle, Acting Chief, Division of Western European Affairs, Feb. 25, SDR 511.4.A.1/ T596.
18. The State Department instructed its diplomatic representatives at Belgrade, Teheran, and Constantinople to give Mrs. Wright all possible assistance even though her mission was unofficial. Phillips to Mrs. Wright, Oct. 18, 1922, SDR 511.4A1/79a.
19. American Consul General G. Bie Ravndal (Constantinople) to the Secretary of State, March 21, 1923, SDR 5114AT/1759.
20. League of Nations, Conference on the Limitation of the Manufacture of Nar-cotic Drugs, Control of Narcotic Drugs in Turkey, Memorandum Forwarded by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Republic, C.382.M.157.1931. VII (Geneva, 1931)•
21. See above, p. 244*
22. Ravndal to the Secretary of State, March 21, 1923, SDR 511.4A ih759.
23. Mrs. Wright to Ramsey Peugnet, Dec. 2, 1923, attached to memorandum by Mrs. Wright entitled "The Opium Problem from the Angle of Production (Persia)," Jan. 28, 1925, SDR 5 1.4.A2/448.
24.For Persia's opium policy and the part Persian opium played in the international traffic down to t936 see Mohammed Chahkar, Le Problème de l'opium en Iran (Paris: Libraire Orientale et Américaine, G. P. Maisonneuve, 1936); Elizabeth B. MacCallum, Twenty Years of Persian Opium 0908-4928) (New York: The Foreign Policy Asso-ciation, 1928) ; and Anthony R. Neligan, The Opium Question, with Special Reference to Persia (London: John Bale, Sons & Danielsson, Ltd., x927).
25. United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs, Review of World Traffic from r January rggo to 3o June 1946, E/CN.7/68, 1947 (New York, 1947), pp• 3, 6.
26. Arthur C. Millspaugh, The American Task in Persia (New York and London: The Century Company, 1925), p. 26o.
27. Persian Minister Hussein Alai (Washington) to Allen W. Dulles, July 29, 1923, SDR 51i.4A1/1819. Encloses excerpts from letters of Millspaugh to Alai concerning opium in Persia, asking Alai to transmit their substance to the State Department.
28.1bid. See also "Memorandum on Opium" prepared by Colonel D. W. Mac-Cormack, a member of the American Financial Mission and the director of the Persian internal revenue, for the Persian delegation at the Second Geneva Opium Conference. A copy of the memorandum was given to the American Government before the conference met. Therefore the United States knew well in advance and in detail what the Persian position at the conference would be. SDR 511.4A1/129.
29. Hussein Alai to Dulles, July 29, 923, SDR 511.4A1/18 9.
3o. Millspaugh to the Persian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 25, 1923; copy enclosed in ibid.
31. ibid. See also MacCallum, op. cit., p. io.
32. "Memorandum on Opium" by MacCormack, SDR 5 r 1.4A2/129.
33. Grew to the American Legation (Berne), Nov. 2, '927, SDR 1.4A2/137.
34. "Memorandum on Opium" by MacCormack, SDR 511.4A2/129.
35. Chargé d'Aifaires W. Smith Murray (Teheran) to the Secretary of State, Feb. 15, 1925, SDR 5114A2/31o; May 13, 1925, SDR 511.4A2/352.
36. See above, p. 16i.
37. Ravndal to Mrs. Wright, May 18, 1925, and Millspaugh to Mrs. Wright, June i8, 1925, SDR 511.4A2/46o.
38.For a convenient chronological summary of the steps leading to the Assembly's action, see Mrs. Moorhead to Dulles, Nov. 18, 1925, SDR 511.4A2/429.
39. Memorandum by Dulles of conversation with Porter, Dec. 16, 192.5, SDR 51x.4A2/124; memorandum by Dulles of a conversation with Frederic A. Delano, Dec. 22, 1925, SDR 511.4A2/444; memorandum of conversations between George Gregg Fuller, Frederic Delano, and by Dulles of conversation with Dr. Taylor of the Department of Agriculture, Feb. 6, 1925, SDR i.4A2/451.
4o. Memorandum of a conversation with Mrs. Wright in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, June 1925, SDR 511.4A2/349.
41. Memorandum of conversation between Mrs. Moorhead, Dulles, and Murray, Nov. 5, toz5, SDR 511.4A2/349.
42. Memorandum by Dulles of conversation with Mrs. Wright, Nov. 2, 1925, SDR 51 .4A2 / 41o; memorandum by Dulles to Grew, Dec. 7, 1925, SDR 5i .4A2/433.
43. League of Nations, Commission of Enquiry into the Production of Opium in Persia, Report to the Council, C.580.M.219.1926.X1 (Geneva, 19z6), p. 5.
44, Ibid., pp. 5-6.
45. Ibid., p. 54.
46. For a convenient summary of the commission's report, see League of Nations, Commission of Enquiry into the Production of Opium in Persia, Letter from the Chairman of the Commission, A.16.192.7.XL (Geneva, 1927).
47-ibid. For the detailed recommendations see the commission's Report to the Coui2cil, pp. 54-56.
48. Minister Hoffman Phillip (Teheran) to the Secretary of State, April 7, 1926, SDR 891.1 I 4 Narcotics/6o.
49. Ibid. See also memorandum by Wallace S. Murray of conversation with Delano, Sept. 9, 1926, SDR 891.114 Narcotics/67.
5o. League of Nations, Commission of Enquiry into the Production of Opium in Persia, Observations of the Persian Government, A.8.1927.X1 (Geneva, 1927), pp. 1-2. 51. Ibid., p. 3.
53. The American Legation (Berne) to the Secretary of State, Nov. 8, 1927, SDR 51z.4A2/556; MacCallum, op. cit., pp. 34-37.
54. Vice-Consul David Williamson (Teheran) to the Secretary of State, July 28, 1928, SDR 891.114 Narcotics/79 and Sept. 17, 1929, SDR 891.114 Narcotics/8 .
55. Memorandum by Grew of conversation with Mrs. Wright, Jan. 15, 1926, SDR 511.4A2/47o.
56. Memorandum by G. Howland Shaw of conversation with Mrs. Wright, June 22, 1926, SDR 867.114/i7.
57. Porter to Henry Ford, Jan. io, 1926, attached to memorandum by Nelson T. Johnson of conversation with Mrs. Wright, Jan. 18, 1928, SDR 511.4A5/1. Mrs. Wright to Grew, Jan. 29, 1927, SDR 8o o.114 N 16/91.
58. Shaw to Ambassador Grew (Constantinople), Dec. 13, i927, SDR 800.114 N 16/91.
59. Mrs. Wright to Secretary of State Kellogg, Feb. 15, 1928, SDR 511.4A5/5; March 23, 1928, SDR 51i 4A5/8; memorandum by Caldwell of conversation with Mrs. Wright, March 17, 1930, SDR 511.4Q1/4-
6o. Secretary of State Kellogg to Mrs. Wright, Feb. 24, 1928, SDR 511.4A5/6; memorandum by Caldwell of conversation with Mrs. Wright, SDR 511401/4.
61. League of Nations Assembly, Fifth Committee, Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, Report by the Fifth Committee to the Assembly, A.65.193i.V (Geneva, 1930, p. 3.
62. Gilbert (Geneva) to the Secretary of State, Sept. 17, 1931, SDR sii.4A5/r3.
63. See, for example, League of Nations, Secretariat, Opium Section, Coca Leaf Questionnaire, C.641.M.303.1933.XI and Ra1.11 opium Questionnaire, C.64o.M.3o2.1933. XI.
64.League of Nations, Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dan-gerous Drugs, Report to the Council on the W ork of the Twenty-First Session, ,.._eneva, 1936), pp. i6—i7. C.z78.M.168.1 N'T (
65. Memorandum by Fuller to Hornbeck, Sept. 7, 1934, SDR 511.4Q1/8.
68. I was not permitted to use the State Department material on these negotiations.
69.Sectetary of State Hull to Norman Armour, American Minister (Ottawa), March 19, 1937, SDR 1.4A5/43.
71. Armour (Ottawa) to the Secretary of State, March 26, 1937, SDR 511.4A5/45; Armour to Fuller, April 15, 1937, SDR 511.4A5/5o; memorandum by George A. Mor-lock to Hornbeck, April 26, 1937, SDR 511.4.A5/53; Armour to Hornbeck, April 29, 1937, SDR 511.4A5/58.
72. For the discussions in the Advisory Committee on this issue, see League of Nations, Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, Minutes of the Twenty-second Session . .. May 24th to June 12th, 7937, C.315.M.211.- 1937.X1 (Geneva, 1937), pp. 68-77, 8o-86.
73. League of Nations, Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Danger-ous Drugs, Report to the Council Concerning Preparatory Work for a Conference to Consider the Possibility of Limiting and Controlling the Cultivation of the Opium Poppy and the Production of Raw Opium and Controlling Other Raw Materials for the Manufacture of Opium Alkaloids. Drawn Up by the Advisory Committee at Its Twenty-third Session (May—June 1938), C.221.M.123.1938.X1 (Geneva, 1938).
74.League of Nations, Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dan-gerous Drugs, Report to the Council Concerning the Preparatory Work for a Con-ference to Consider the Possibility of Limiting and Controlling the Cultivation of the Opium Poppy and the Production of Raw Opium ...Drawn Up by the Advisory Committee at Its Twenty-fourth Session (May—June r939) C.175.M.m4.1939.X1 (Ge-neva, 1930.
78. Renborg, op. cit., pp. 17z-173.
79. Ibid., pp. z 7 3-174.
80.For these views, see Secretary of State to the American Chargé d'Affaires (Berne), Feb. 24, 1935, SDR 511.4A5/9o.
81. Helen H. Moorhead, "International Narcotics Control: T939-1946," Foreign Policy Association Reports, XXII (July 1, 1946), 95-96.
82.For the conference, see United Nations, Economic and Social Council, United Nations Opium Conference: Summary Record, E/Conf.14/SR. 1953 (New York, 1953)•